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Analysis on the European Parliament's Party Group Voting Trends

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MASTER THESIS

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Abstract

This study aims at understanding the voting trends within European Parliament's party groups, as each party grouping votes on every piece of legislation that is brought forward by the European Commission. Through this study, empirical conclusions were sought after how MEPs vote in relation to their European Parliament party group. A successive time interval was chosen to analyse the voting trends within and between different European Parliament party groups.

Through this research, it was hypothesised that European Parliament party groups are cyclical in cohesiveness and that MEPs prefer to vote according to their European Parliament Group's views, rather than their National Party.

An analysis was drawn up to understand how each party group votes, to investigate whether MEPs are cohesive to their party group or not. Since MEPs have three options when casting their votes, it was more astute to use the Agreement Index, which is a cohesive measure. Additionally, this measure was gauged on roll-call votes, and time-scaled it to a five-term voting data, which is equivalent to 35 years of voting data. Only after this collation were each European Parliament party group's voting trends over time. Furthermore, MEP survey data was used to capture what influences MEPs when casting their vote.

It was confirmed that all European Parliament party groups are consistently increasing and decreasing in cohesiveness. This observation followed the Fusion Theory, which denounces that governance integration is seen in a cyclical form. Additionally, through factor analysis, it was also confirmed that MEPs preferred to vote for their European Parliament Group views rather than their National Party's views.

Keywords: European Parliament, political parties, national parties, roll-call votes, cohesion

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1 Introduction

1.1 Problem Area

European Parliament's MEPs have the power to 'enact legislation in a wide range of policy areas, amend most lines in the budget, veto the governments' nominee for the Commission President, and censure the Commission' [1]. This enables MEPs to vote on such matters and could change how the European Union operates. Through this study, it is hoped that an empirical conclusion is sought after how MEPs vote in relation to their European Parliament party group. A successive time interval is chosen to analyse the trend between different European Parliament terms. Additionally, these results will be compared to a survey published to MEPs to analyse their personal beliefs in their voting.

1.2 Aims and Objectives

In this study, the relationship of how an MEP votes with respect to their European Parliament party was investigated. The study investigates further on how MEPs follow their voting instructions from other entities and whether MEPs stay strong to their European Parliament party or else abide by their national party's position. This is primarily an interesting aspect of political science as 'EU decisions once adopted attain supremacy over existing and future national legislation in the member states and function as constraints on policy change.' [2]. The mode of political democracy that is witnessed within the European Parliament is of contemporary democracy, through representative democracy [3]. This links citizens to a representative, i.e. an MEP, to yield their views into the political system of the European Parliament, whilst also promoting their agenda to a respective political party [3].

1.3 Hypothesis

The first hypothesis proposed is that European Parliament party groups are cyclical in cohesiveness. This is due to European-wide integration between member states as exemplified by Wallace, as the 'Integration Process' [4]. It is represented by having four views of integration, as time progresses. One view illustrates the 'Fusion Theory', which revolves around the 'European-wide interdependencies and strong trends towards globalization' whilst exhibiting integration in successive up and down cycles [4], [5].

The second hypothesis proposed is that MEPs prefer to vote according to their European Parliament Group views, rather than their National Party. This is due to the integration-related theories that indicate considerable growth in administrative participation, directing to a ‘considerable Europeanization of national administrations’ [6]. Theoretical behavioural patterns show that ‘fundamental constitutional issues and exact legal forms are controversial’ [6].

1.4 Motivation for this study

Through my study, it was hoped that scholars are enabled in analysing trends within the various European Parliament terms, to gather more knowledge on how votes are cast in future legislation. Having this sort of empirical analysis can further analyse the behaviour in other governments, to understand how individuals vote within an institutional body.

1.5 Background and Literature Review

Relevant data and literature was explored and knowledge about the subject area was collated to gain knowledge and understand what it was comprised of. Significant data collated by previous scholars will be explored consequently to the hypothesis presented.

1.6 Methodology and Data

After completion of the previous chapter, strong assumptions were deduced and a methodology was developed in conducting this research. I will gather relevant data conducted by previous scholars and investigate accordingly to my hypothesis.

1.7 Analysis and Results

Equipped with valuable data, enquiring the gathered information will help concentrate in obtaining concise results. Later a discussion will follow on how specific results were attained.

2 Background and Literature Review

2.1 Background

Through this dissertation, it aids to understand what influences an MEP when they cast their vote. Conversely, representatives have a decision on their hands whether to vote in favour, against or abstain legislation, where they must balance their counterparts ranging from overall electorate, constituents, pressure from party leaders and/or ideological leanings [7], [8].

2.1.1 The European Parliament

The European Parliament is half of the EU's 'legislative authority', which is shared with the European Council [1]. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by citizens from their national states, to directly represent them in this higher institute. Elections are held every five years, and all citizens, over the age of eighteen, are eligible to vote, except for Austria and Malta, which are set at sixteen [9]. The European Parliament is made up of 751 members, known as Members of the European Parliament (MEP), from the 28 European Union member states [10]. Each member state is allotted certain amount of MEP seats depending on their country's population. In Figure 1, the European Parliament is seen to be composed of the following MEPs from their respective member states.




Figure 1: MEP seats per Member State [82]

Conversely, the European Parliament, the European Council and the European Commission, through the ordinary legislative procedure and co-decision procedure, are the European Union's 'law-making body' where it has three main roles, which are illustrated in Table 1:

Table 1: European Union Main Roles [9], [11]

Roles	Description
Legislative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shares the power of legislation with the European Council to pass laws, based on the European Commission's proposals. • Settling on international agreements and EU enlargements • Review the European Commission's work programme and furthering it to recommend legislation.
Supervisory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratically scrutinises all EU institutes. • Power in electing the European Commission's President whilst also approving the European Commission as a whole. • Right to censure the European Commission as a whole. • Assess to citizen's petitions and to investigate further. • Questioning the European Commission and European Council
Budgetary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shares authority with the European Council to establish the yearly EU budget, which effects EU spending as a whole. • At the end of the budget procedure, it is responsible for approving or rejecting the budget in its entirety.

Most MEPs are associated with a national political party. MEPs from across the member states, form European Parliament political groups on the basis of their political affiliation [12]. Formation of a political group consists of at least twenty-five MEPs, elected from at least seven member states, which amounts to one-quarter of the member states. Evidently, by forming a new European Parliament group, MEPs accept their 'political affinity' to that particular group [12]. Yet, it is interesting to mention Coz and McCubbins' reasonable question:

“How can a group of formally equal and self-interested legislators, with demonstrably diverse preferences on many issues, agree on the creation or maintenance of a party?” [13]

It is imperative to regard ‘political outcomes as the product of the interaction of preference and institutions’ because sometimes it is a cooperational situation amongst politicians to keep the party whole [13].

As Hix exclaimed, ‘No single party family dominates EU politics.’ [1]. The European Parliament is based on the left-right political spectrum, a system that classifies ideologies, parties and political positions [1]. Although, it is often seen that the left-wing parties and right-wing parties are opposite each other, yet there are instances where their stances overlap [14]. Beyme was able to categorise seven of the European parties from left to right, which are as follows: communist, socialist, green, liberal, Christian democratic, conservative and right-wing extremists [15]. A socialist party is usually a party that follows the political stance for workers, whereas the Christian Democrats were followed by Christians who saw liberalism a means of threat towards their traditional values [15]. While, the communists were a split amongst socialists who were in support of World War I and World War II and the right-wing extremists are on the right-most side of the spectrum, which include fascists, nationalist parties and extreme conservatives [15]. Lastly, green parties rejected socialist ideology as they are more liberal on social issues [15].

In the context of European Politics, the communists are driven by European United Left-Nordic Green Left, the centre-left by Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, the greens by Greens/European Free Alliance, the liberals by Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, the centre-right by European People’s Party/ Christian Democrats, the conservatives by European Conservatives and Reformists and the right-wing extremists by Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy. Lastly, there are Non-Attached MEPs who do not belong to a party, for political reasons. However, the pro-European parties, which side from the centre-left, liberals and centre-right, are composed of 80% of the European Parliament [1].

Furthermore, in the European Parliament, each MEP sits in a political grouping, as they are not organised by nationality but by political affiliation [16]. There are currently eight political groups in the European Parliament, including Non-Attached Members. Figure 2 illustrates how MEPs are distributed amongst political groups, sorted by the left-right spectrum.




Figure 2: Number of MEPs in each Political Group [9]

Additionally, each political party in the European Parliament are different from one another, as can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2: European Parliament Political Group Characteristics

Political Group	Established	Mission Statement	Number of national parties included in the group	Number of European countries present in the group	Number of European Parliament MEP seats
European United Left – Nordic Green Left [18]	1995 (preceded by European United Left, 1989, and Communist and Allies Group, 1973)	Vision of socially equitable, peaceful and sustainable European integration.	33	14	52
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats [19]	1953	Principles of freedom, equality, solidarity, diversity and fairness.	43	28	191
Greens/ European Free Alliance [20]	1999 (joined forces between EFA and Greens)	To build a society respectful of fundamental human rights and environmental justice.	38	22	50
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats of Europe [21]	2004 (preceded by ELDR, 1952)	Values on the defence of liberal democracy, fundamental rights and a European identity.	62	27	68
European People's Party [22]	1976	Strives for a democratic, transparent and efficient European that is close to its citizens.	51	29	220
European Conservatives and Reforms [23]	2009	Dedicated to individual liberty, national sovereignty, parliamentary democracy, private property, limited government, free trade, family values and the devolution of power.	14	12	70
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy [24]	2014 (Preceded by EFD, 2009, Independence/Democracy, 2004, European of Democracies and Diversities, 1999, Eurosceptic)	favours an open, transparent, democratic and accountable co-operation among the sovereign European States and rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European superstate.	10	8	48
Non-Attached MEPs [25]	1979	Range from conservatism, nationalism and national conservatism to social liberalism, populism, communism and neo-nazism.	13	6	52

Within the legislative body of the European Parliament, the European Parliament Standing Committees are its ‘legislative backbone’, as each committee deals with a particular competency of how the European Parliament will stand [17]. As of 2018, Table 3 illustrates the European Parliament’s committees:

Table 3: European Parliament Committees and MEP Chairs [18]

Committee	Acronym	Chair	Group	Member State
Foreign Affairs	AFET	Elmar Brok	EPP	Germany
Human Rights (Subcommittee)	DROI	Elena Valenciano	S&D	Spain
Security and Defence (Subcommittee)	SEDE	Anna Fotyga	ECR	Poland
Development	DEVE	Linda McAvan	S&D	UK
International Trade	INTA	Bernd Lange	S&D	Germany
Budgets	BUDG	Jean Arthuis	ALDE	Italy
Budgetary Control	CONT	Ingeborg Gräßle	EPP	Germany
Economic and Monetary Affairs	ECON	Roberto Gualtieri	S&D	Italy
Employment and Social Affairs	EMPL	Thomas Händel	EUL/NGL	Germany
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety	ENVI	Giovanni La Via	EPP	Italy
Industry, Research and Energy	ITRE	Jerzy Buzek	EPP	Poland
Internal Market and Consumer Protection	IMCO	Vicky Ford	ECR	UK
Transport and Tourism	TRAN	Michael Cramer	G/EFA	Germany
Regional Development	REGI	Iskra Mihaylova	ALDE	Bulgaria

Agriculture and Rural Development	AGRI	Czesław Siekierski	EPP	Poland
Fisheries	PECH	Alain Cadec	EPP	France
Culture and Education	CULT	Silvia Costa	S&D	Italy
Legal Affairs	JURI	Pavel Svoboda	EPP	Czech Republic
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs	LIBE	Claude Moraes	S&D	UK
Constitutional Affairs	AFCO	Danuta Hübner	EPP	Poland
Women's Rights and Gender Equality	FEMM	Iratze García	S&D	Spain
Petitions	PETI	Cecilia Wikström	ALDE	Sweden

Each committee meets every month, for one to two weeks, to conduct their committee work. MEPs discuss non-legislative and legislative reports during committee meetings to forward their stand on, which would later be the European Parliament's stand, to the European Council [19]. These committees have the formal powers, such as forwarding questions to the Council or Commission, forwarding questions to external experts, proposing resolutions to other community institutes and proposing amendments to the European Parliament's plenary agenda [20]. Each committee appoints an MEP and shadow MEPs, from their respective European Parliament party group. The former is responsible in guiding the decision-making process entirely, in view to thoroughly examine the European Parliament's position on the committee's matter, whereas the latter, also known as shadow rapporteur, is responsible for the committee subject within their party group, so as to help the committee in pursuit to come to a concession on the legislative proposal [19], [21]. Additionally, the draft report that is written up by the rapporteur is then subject to amendments by the MEPs in the committee. Lastly, the original report and the amendments are voted on by the full committee, and the final report is submitted to the plenary for approval [19].

Additionally, the European Parliament has adopted two special status committees. This is due to these committees being outside of the competences of the European Union, which are as follows in Table 4:

Table 4: European Parliament Special Committees [22]

Committee	Acronym	Chair	Group	Member State
Terrorism	TERR	Nathalie Griesbeck	ALDE	France
EU authorisation procedure for pesticides	PEST	Clara Eugenia Aguilera García	S&D	Spain
Financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance	TAX3	Petr Ježek	ALDE	Czech Republic

2.1.2 Ordinary Legislative Procedure

Each European law depends on a particular treaty article, colluded as the ‘legal basis’ of an enactment [9]. This initiates which legislative procedure must be taken [9]. The treaty sets out the basic decision-making process, including the European Commission’s recommendations, progressive readings by the European Parliament and European Council, and the sentiments of the advisory bodies. Likewise, it sets down when unanimity is required [9], [23]. The vast majority part of EU legislation is categorised using a formal procedure, by utilising the Ordinary Legislative Procedure [24]. In this process, the European Parliament and the European Council share authoritative power [9].

As can be seen in Figure 3, the process starts with the European Commission [9], [25]. Firstly, before the European Commission submits a proposal to the European Parliament and European Council, they also invite other expert entities to give their opinion on the matter being discussed, such as civil society organisations, businesses, governments and individuals [9], [25]. Additionally, the Committee of Regions and/or European Economic and Social Committee’s opinions are also brought forward to include in the proposal. All the opinions presented by these entities are forwarded to the European Council and European Parliament, with the European Commission’s proposal [9], [25]. Any proposal can be brought up either by the European Council, European Parliament, European citizens or by the European Commission’s own initiative [9], [25].




Figure 3: Ordinary Legislative Procedure [9]

Furthermore, the European Council and the European Parliament, separately read and discuss the proposal, with amendments being forwarded to each entity after each reading. The European Parliament's decision-making process is based on majority vote, i.e. 50% + 1 of members in the Parliament need to approve for their stand to pass [25]. In the case of the European Council, a qualified majority is needed for the council to establish their stand in both readings [7]. The qualified majority is a decision-making mechanism where two conditions are to be met for their position to be established, which are

- 72% of EU countries vote in favour of the proposal
- The proposal is backed and supported by countries that have 65% of the total EU population [26].

If both entities agree to the proposal, the act is approved [9]. Alternatively, if both entities do not come to an agreement after their second readings, the proposal is brought forward to the Conciliation Committee.

The Conciliation Committee is the final stage of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and has the objective of reaching an agreement in the form of a 'joint text' between the European Parliament and European Council [27]. The Conciliation Committee consists of 56 members, split evenly between the European Parliament and European Council [27]. From the European Commission, there are 28 members, each representing their Member State, where they can be ministers or representatives, and from the European Parliament, there are 28 members, each appointed by their European political party groups [27]. The Conciliation Committee is chaired by one of the vice-presidents from the European Parliament, whilst being facilitated by the Commissioner from the European Commission [27].

After the Conciliation Committee has produced the 'joint text', both the European Parliament and European Council have to decide on the amended proposal. If in any case and within a determined time period, both the European Parliament or the European Council agree with the proposed 'joint text', the act is adopted, else the act is adopted [27].

However, Codecision is the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, yet it is seen to have an increase in legislation being passed at first and early second readings [28]. Codecision is also categorised as early agreements, which are fast-tracked compromises between the European Parliament and the European Council [28]. The Ordinary Legislative Procedure does not require that the entire procedure is followed, as the European Council and the European Parliament can come to an agreement earlier on, which would lead to an early decision. The procedure is expressed before the early start of the first reading agreement, where the European Commission proposes legislation [28]. The European Parliament, European Council and European Commission start informal negotiations, which are known as ‘trilogies’ [28]. This is done before both the European Council and European Parliament establish their stance, to which they would agree to an informal agreement, and later the legislation would pass through the first reading. However, if the European Council and European Parliament reach a disagreement before the first reading, the European Parliament includes the European Council’s proposition in the first reading [28]. On the other hand, an early second reading agreement is likely when the European Parliament adopts the European Council’s stance [28].

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Analytical Approach

The first objective that is required to convey optimal and satisfactory results in the research at hand is to break down the problem into several smaller modules to explore and tackle separately.

The study undertaken will be broken down in the following manner:

- MEPs and European Parliament Party Groups
- Group Voting in the European Parliament:
- European Parliament Party Cohesion

2.2.1.1 MEPs and European Parliament Party Groups

European Parliament party groups play an important role in the European Parliament, as they gain several advantages within the European Parliament's political and organisational structures [29]. Furthermore, MEPs who are non-attached members, i.e. do not belong to a European Parliament political party, can still nominate members to committees and delegations, yet they are at an advantage without substantial backing to elect someone to committee chairs or to appoint rapporteurs [29]. Also, belonging to a political group enables MEPs to gain appropriate speaking time in debates, such as the plenary, as speaking time is divided amongst all party groups equally, whilst the non-attached members have an overall speaking time [29]. This is cumbersome for non-attached members, as individuals might be from different sides of the left-right spectrum of the European Parliament and they might not have enough time for their agenda to be spoken of during the plenary.

MEPs and political parties might indulge in conflict amongst each other, as they have different incentives and preference which they wish to direct [3]. This is seen to be minimised in the way the European Parliament's standard proceedings are formed, as it operates on a four-week routine. The committee standard proceedings give the floor for discussion amongst MEPs, where their conflicts are given a feat to be resolved. Table 5 illustrates how MEPs time is divided on the standard proceedings.

Table 5: European Parliament Standard Proceedings [3]

Week	Description
1	MEPs conduct committee work
2	
3	MEPs and Political groups meet up and come to a consensus internally.
4	MEPs meet up for the plenary week.

This demonstrates that MEPs have ample time to delve and research a particular motion, whilst also indulging MEPs to discuss with their constituents in their political groups, to find compromises and allow discourse amongst them [3].

2.2.1.2 Group Voting in the European Parliament

The European Parliament voting system is based on the ternary voting rules [30], [31]. During the voting time, each MEP has the possibility of voting in 3 ways; which are, No (N), Abstain (A) or Yes (Y). These three variables have an ordinary relationship as $N < A < Y$, as explained by Felsenthal and Machover [30] and Slomczynski and Stolicki [31], whereas Felsenthal and Machover justified that each vote option is equivalent to -1, 0 or 1, respectively, towards the final outcome of the vote.

Furthermore, there might be cases where the voting quorum rule is applied, i.e. a minimum amount of MEPs present for the vote to pass [30]. Additionally, there might be some instances where the ‘special absolute majority’ rule is imposed [31]. This is observed when a motion needs at least a number of Yes votes that exceed half the number of all the MEPs within the European Parliament, for the motion to pass [31].

As mentioned previously, the three possible variables are in an ordinary relationship, yet not all are equidistant from each other, as abstention is a neutral choice, since it does not lean towards neither an approval nor disapproval of the motion being passed [31]. As discussed by Slomczynski and Stolicki [31], the distance is seen to have an equal interval scale between each other, as seen in Equation 1.

$$d(N, A) = d(A, Y) = 2(Y, N)$$

Equation 1: Equal Interval Scale of Possible Voting [31]

Likewise, Equation 1 can be figuratively expressed as Figure 4:




Figure 4: Equal interval scale of voting choices [31]

Within the European Parliament, and during the plenary week, MEPs vote on a particular motion, as mentioned in the previous section. The voting procedure varies, as there are three possibilities of how MEP vote, as can be seen in Table 6 [32].

Table 6: European Parliament Voting Procedures

Type of Voting Procedure	Description
Acclamation	Visual check of majority
Electronic Voting – Non-Roll-Call Vote	MEPs' votes are recorded, but only final results are published
Electronic Voting – Roll-Call Vote	MEPs' votes are recorded, list of individual MEPs votes are published

The most used voting procedure in the European Parliament is acclamation, where MEPs votes are counted visually [32]. Additionally, there are two types of electronic voting; which are Non-Roll-Call votes and Roll-Call Votes. In the former, the MEPs' votes are recorded, yet only the final result is published and not how each MEP individually voted [32]. However, in roll-call votes, the final result is accompanied by a list of names of MEPs, which shows how each particular MEP voted; either Yes, No or Abstained [32].

For the purpose of this study, the latter voting procedure can be utilised to investigate voting behaviour within the European Parliament, as public data can be requested for

analysis. Although some researchers, such as Mocek, Mann, Yordanova and Mühlböck have argued that roll-call votes are used as a political tool [32]–[34]. This is because roll-call votes are taken at a demand by a political party, instead of the usual acclamation, as ‘... a roll-call vote must be taken if requested by a political group or at least 40 Members the evening before the vote.’ [32], [35]. As expressed by Mocek, other researchers criticise the use of roll-call votes analysis as being ‘inconclusive because votes are not evenly distributed throughout the voting population, thereby distorting the overall picture of MEP behaviour’ [32], [36]–[39]. Furthermore, it transpires that only a third of votes are taken as roll-call votes [32], [40]. Fortunately, in 2009, the European Parliament Code of Procedure was altered to the point that all legislative acts’ final vote need to be taken in roll-call votes [32], [41]. Lastly but most importantly, there is one researcher who is at the forefront of the European Parliament roll-call vote analysis. This is Simon Hix [18], [42]–[47]. His team and himself, mainly focus on the cohesion and competition aspects in MEP voting data, analysing their behaviour in the European Parliament. Their conclusions were as follows:

- European Parliament party group cohesion is high because votes are usually split along the left-right lines [18].
- European Parliament party group cohesion has increased over time, as main party groups have gained in size and as the powers of the European Parliament have increased [42].
- European Parliament as a whole has decreased steadily in cohesion since 1998, due to ‘a decline in the number of votes that are highly consensual’ [43].
- European Parliament party group cohesion has remained high and has neither decreased nor increased significantly, whilst voting along national lines has remained low [44].
- Main factors of MEP voting in the European Parliaments are policy positions of national parties [45].
- European Parliament party-based voting has increased, likely due to increased powers of the European Parliament rather than the international ideological coherence of the groups [46], [48].
- In open-list proportional representation, large districts or decentralised candidate selections, MEPs are more independent agents and are freer to vote with their European party group rather than their national parties [47].

- European Parliament cohesion, as a whole, has been rising between 1979 and 1987 and then decline until 2004 [49].

Voting behaviour explores the factors that influence the decisions of MEPs on how they vote [50]. It is a bridge between political science and psychology expertise, which apprehend the ‘affective influence’ of how voters may have cast their vote and whether there are certain trends in how individuals vote [51].

Primarily, the Rice Index was a measurement to grade the voting cohesion in legislation votes for a political group. The Rice Index, also known as ‘index of voting likeness’, shows the absolute difference between the Yes and No votes. Yet, the Rice Index, as expressed by Hix, Noury and Roland in [42], was not ideal in the context of the European Parliament, as MEPs have three voting options and not two. The Rice Index is represented in Equation 2.

$$Rice\ Index = \frac{|Yes - No|}{Yes + No}$$

Equation 2: Rice Index [60]

Later, The Index of Agreement was developed by Fulvio Attiná and was a standardised measure in quantitative analysis of voting behaviour in European Parliament [52]–[54]. It was widely used in the studies focused on voting cohesion behaviour of MEP within the European Parliament [3], [45], [54]. The index is a means to undermine the relationship between the three-possible voting option that an MEP can vote; Yes, No or Abstain. Furthermore, it measures the percentage of relation between [54]:

- The difference between the highest modality and the sum of the other two modalities.
- The total number of votes cast by a European Parliament Group.

Equation 3 illustrates the Index of Agreement.

$$Index\ of\ Agreement = \frac{Highest\ modality - Sum\ of\ the\ other\ two\ modalities}{Total\ number\ of\ votes} \times 100$$

Equation 3: Index of Agreement [51]

In Table 7, one can observe the possible results from the Index of Agreement:

Table 7: Index of Agreement Possible Results [54]

Index of Agreement Possible Result	Description
100	All MEPs in a group voted the same.
99 – 1	Agreement between MEPs decreases, yet more than 50% of the MEPs voted the same.
0	Agreement is split between one modality and equal to the sum of the other two.
0 – (-33)	MEP votes are varied amongst three modalities; whilst the highest modality is less than half of the group vote.

However, this method of quantitative analysis is cumbersome as it gave a range from -33 to 100. Thus, this approach was revised and resolved by Hix, Noury, and Roland in [42], coining the measure of group cohesion as the Agreement Index. The Agreement Index is denoted in Equation 4:

$$Agreement\ Index_i = \frac{Max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2}[(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - Max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{(Y_i + N_i + A_i)}$$

Equation 4: Agreement Index [42]

Equation 4 explicates that Y_i is the number of Yes votes by a group on any vote $_i$. Alternatively, N_i is the number of No votes, and A_i is the number of Abstain votes. Table 8 shows the possible outcomes of the Agreement index.

Table 8: Agreement Index Results Indication [42]

Agreement Index Possible Results	Description
1	All MEP in a group voted the same.
1-0	MEP votes vary between Yes, No and Abstain
0	MEP votes are evenly distributed between Yes, No and Abstain.

Figures 5, 6 and 7 are examples of the Rice Index, Index of Agreement and Agreement Index, respectively. The examples illustrate a summary of possible votes for a group of size 10. The Rice Index is calculated independently from Index of Agreement and Agreement Index as it applies only to Yes and No votes.




Figure 6: Cohesion Example: Rice Example




Figure 5: Cohesion Example: Index of Agreement




Figure 7: Cohesion Example: Agreement Index

We can observe that the Index of Agreement is based on a nuisance scale, yet is still relatable to the Agreement Index, i.e. when Index of Agreement between is 100.00 – 0.00 then Agreement Index is between 1.00 - 0.50 and when Index of Agreement between 0.00 - (-33.00) then Agreement Index is between 0.50 – 0.00. As all three of these quantitative methods were previously used to measure party group cohesion in previous studies [42], [43], [49], [55]–[61], Table 9 illustrates what makes them differ from each other, through advantages and disadvantages:

Table 9: Quantitative methods for party cohesion

Quantitative Method	Advantages	Disadvantages
Rice Index	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial understanding in the study of vote cohesion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only absolute difference between Yes and No votes. Not applicable within the European Parliament context as MEPs have three voting options.

Index of Agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cohesion measurement specifically for European Parliament. • Takes three voting options in consideration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cumbersome scaling as even split amongst voting option would give a negative outcome. • Non-linear scale
Agreement Index	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Takes three voting options in consideration. • Outcome of the result between 0 and 1. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does not account for co-voting by chance [56]. • Does not accommodate the means of agreeableness between two different political groups [56]. • Party-size bias – ‘small parties will tend to appear more cohesive than large parties’ [60].

Due to these advantages and disadvantages, the Agreement Index is favoured, as although it is the latest index developed in the political science field, it is an appropriate means of measurement within the European Parliament context, as MEPs have three options of voting, and the measurement is concise, on a gradient of cohesiveness from 0 to 1.

2.2.1.3 European Parliament Party Cohesion

Cohesion within the European Parliament party groups is the basis of understanding the measurable link between the members of a particular group; whilst also illustrating of how homogeneous a group really is [62]. This link can be observed through extensive studies with roll-call votes.

Firstly, Fulvio Attiná in [54] had completed an analysis on roll-call votes through a systematic sample of votes cast during the first and second elected European Parliament terms. Attiná investigated European Parliament party group cohesion using a cohesion measure that she developed herself, coined as the Index of Agreement. Attiná used analytical datum from roll-call votes to determine the nature of the European Parliament

party groups and concluded that the party groups are formations from national groups which have a high political and ideological affinity. This was an insightful research, yet, as mentioned in the previous subsection, with regards to the cohesion index developed by Attin , they coined a cumbersome index which is based on a non-linear scale.

Secondly, Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and G rard Roland in [49] describe the importance of why the European Parliament party groups exist and how they become so powerful through group cohesion. They look into the spatial analysis of voting in the European Parliament and cohesion amongst members, which would reduce ‘dimensionality of voting and also increases stability’ [49]. They measured cohesion by using the Rice Index. Additionally, Hix *et al* portray that the European Parliament party group cohesion ‘as a whole has varied considerably since 1979: rising between 1979 and 1987 and then declining until 2004.’ Time-series analysis was used to identify changes in political group cohesion between different periods and cross-sectional analysis to observe the variance in political group cohesion in all votes. Roland examines the effects of ‘agenda setting, pivotality, political group size and the EU’s legislative procedures.’ [49]. They conclude that they have observed higher cohesion in co-decision procedure (where ‘European Parliament has equal legislative power with the EU governments’) and lower cohesion in the consultation procedure (where ‘when the European Parliament is weaker than the Commission’). This is particularly an interesting study since they analysed the European Parliament party group cohesion on a time-series bases.

Alternatively, Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and G rard Roland in [42] had shown strengths and the Agreement Index of the European Parliament party groups between June 1979 to June 2001. They used roll-call data to analyse patterns of party cohesion and coalition formation. Subsequently, they calculated the strength, by seats in the European Parliament, and the Agreement Index, a group cohesion measure coined by Hix. They observed an upward trend for PES (S&D), ELDR and Greens, downwards trend for EPP since the second European Parliament and both upward and downward trend for Radical Left and the Gaullists and allies. Hix *et al* results helped to indicate that the European Parliament has ‘behaved in an increasingly organised and competitive fashion’ [42]. In Table 10, we can observe Hix *et al* final results on cohesion within European Parliament parties, for the first five European Parliamentary terms. Hix *et al* have shown that party cohesion increased after each term due to party group size and increased party group

powers in the European Parliament. Moreover, they specify that ideological differences between member state and European Parliament parties have minimal effect on cohesion [42]. Cohesion scores have been used on roll-call votes to analyse the ‘strength of a legislative party’ since the 1920s, where studies were applied to the US Congress [3], [60]. Hix *et al* concluded that cohesion of the European Parliament party groups has increased over time whilst the main parties have increased in size whilst the powers of the European Parliament have also increased. Hix *et al* exemplified that their research has suggested an explanation of the political organisation and behaviour in the European Parliament.

1

Table 10: Cohesion of Party Groups: Absolute Cohesion using Agreement Index [Adopted from [42]]

	EP 1		EP 2		EP 3		EP 4		EP 5	
	(1979-84)		(1984-89)		(1989-94)		(1994-99)		(1999-04)	
Party	Cohesion	Standard Deviation	Cohesion	Standard Deviation	Cohesion	Standard Deviation	Cohesion	Standard Deviation	Cohesion	Standard Deviation
PES	0.757	0.25	0.869	0.19	0.900	0.16	0.901	0.15	0.902	0.14
EPP	0.899	0.15	0.934	0.13	0.907	0.13	0.898	0.14	0.860	0.17
ELDR	0.849	0.21	0.849	0.22	0.847	0.22	0.861	0.17	0.882	0.15
LEff	0.812	0.24	0.871	0.20	0.861	0.25	0.804	0.23	0.780	0.21
GAUL	0.800	0.26	0.842	0.23	0.849	0.22	0.788	0.24	0.717	0.27
GRN			0.813	0.26	0.850	0.19	0.913	0.16	0.927	0.15
ANTI					0.834	0.29	0.673	0.28	0.535	0.27
NA	0.740	0.30	0.794	0.31	0.805	0.27	0.634	0.29	0.463	0.25
No. of RCVs	886		2146		2732		3739		5745	

¹ Key: PES: Party of European Socialists (SOC, PES); EPP: European People's Party - Christian Democrats & Conservatives (EPP, EPP-ED) and Italian Conservatives (FE); ELDR: European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELD, ELDR groups); LEFT: Radical Left (COM, LU, EUL/NGL) and Italian Communists & allies (EUL); GAUL: Gaullists & allies (EPD, EDA, UFE, UEN); GRN: Greens & allies (RBW(84), G, G/EFA); ANTI: Anti-European s (EN, I-EN, EDD); NA: Non-attached members.

Additionally, Thorsten Faas in [3] had carried an analysis on the party group cohesion, specifically on the 5th European Parliament. Faas used 1,370 roll-call votes for analysis and subsequently confirmed previous findings of high levels of European Parliament group cohesion. Additionally, it was also acknowledged that ‘Brzinski found that party groups with a high degree of “multi-nationality” (members from many different member states and many different national parties) are less cohesive.’ [3], [63]. Although it was not possible to get hold of Brzinski’s research due to accessibility issues, his findings could have resulted because of national parties coming from far diverse ideologies than European Parliament party group ideology would anticipate. Subsequently, the roll-call votes were taken from July 1999 to September 2001, based on reports on committee and examination during plenary. Faas exclaimed that one report includes quite a number of votes due to the two-stage process, and most of the reports conclude that the European Parliament established its official position at the very last step. Moreover, official statistics show that 15% of votes were done through roll-call votes, different from the norm which is a show of hands. Faas concluded that there is a high level of party group cohesion in the European Parliament and national parties could induce a breakdown of party group cohesion by putting pressure on their MEPs, in placing special requests to them. This study is contradictory to the previous one, from the perspective that party group cohesion can deter if MEPs are pressured from the member states.

Alternatively, Simon Hix and Abdul Noury in [44] analysed roll-call votes from the first half of the sixth European Parliament (July 2004 till December 2006) whilst comparing it to voting behaviour to the previous parliament (1999-2004). Hix and Noury looked into party cohesion, coalition formation and spatial map of voting by members of the European Parliament. They verified steady levels of European Parliament party cohesion across left-right parliament spectrum, whilst using the Agreement Index, which was developed by Hix in previous studies, and that the ideological distance was the most predictor of coalition preferences. They concluded that voting behaviour in the European Parliament had changed little as the political groups’ cohesion has remained high with no substantial increase in decline. Their main findings observed a change in voting behaviour in the fifth and first half of the Sixth European Parliament. Additionally, they found that as political groups grew in size, their voting cohesion also increased due to more incentives to divide and concentrate on tasks between the party group members and found that MEPs from new member-states from Central and Eastern Europe voted

slightly more with national lines than the MEPs from the original 15 member-states. Finally, they observed that party cohesion is lower in the first few months of any European Parliament due to the fact that MEPs integrate gradually into their political groups and get acquainted with their political-groups' whip and leaders.

Also, Simon Hix in [45] looks into personal policy preference as to whether European Parliament party groups force MEPs to tie with the party line. Hix's main factors suggested that the voting behaviour of the European Parliament are policy positions posed by national parties. Hix demonstrates that when national parties in the same parliamentary group vote together, the European Parliament parties are very cohesive, yet when parties have opposed views on policy positions, the cohesion within the European Parliament parties breaks down. Hix concludes that for the European Union to be genuinely a 'transnational' party system and have cohesive voting behaviour in the European Parliament parties, their respective national parties should not manipulate their MEPs voting decisions.

Moreover, Emily Gische in [57] analysed voting in the European Parliament on the general and foreign policy issues for the first five Parliament legislature, from 1979 to 2004. Gische confirmed previous literature that for the first five elected parliaments, European-wide parties in the European Parliament tend to vote more along European Parliament party lines than national country lines. Gische analysis illustrates that voting in the European Parliament can be predicted on the party lines rather than the country lines. Gische concluded that the party groups have become more cohesive and influential as the European Parliament matures, as it will only gain in strength and influence. This will later be investigated through the survey questions to determine which voting instructions MEPs follow.

On the other hand, Monika Mühlböck and Nikoleta Yordanova in [64] exclaimed that only a subset of votes are taken in roll-call votes, and due to this, the selection bias and data findings may result in overestimating party group cohesion. They used Group-Line Index and Agreement Index, where the former is a simple measure of 'the proportion of MEPs voting with the group line (i.e. the majority of the group) out of the total number of group members that did not abstain. They concluded that roll-call votes could lead to underestimation rather than overestimation in group cohesion; which contradicts what

previous studies have shown. Although this was an astute study, the European Parliament has boosted in transparency by requiring all ‘final votes in committee on resolutions and on legislation’ to be taken in roll-call votes [65]. Through this method, each MEP will have their vote recorded as either being for, against or abstain. Additionally, this will enable MEPs to be more accountable and responsible towards their voters, which after all, are representing them on a European level.

3 Methodology and Data

Methodology entails the actual acquisition of how the research data is obtained and how the data was processed to obtain valuable information. For the purpose of this study, publicly available roll-call voting data will be used for analysis. This data was subsequently provided to us by Hix, Noury and Roland through their work² [44], [49], [66], [67]. Additionally, MEP survey data will be used, in relation to the quantitative data results, to support our findings. This chapter will be divided in the following manner:

- Roll-Call Votes
- Survey Data

3.1 Roll-Call Votes

As mentioned in the previous chapter, roll-call votes are data which illustrate how each MEP votes in the plenary session on any legislation or amendments being passed. This would help in our findings to accommodate the interest of how cohesive a European Parliament party group is.

3.1.1 Pre-processing

It was sound to conduct our very own European Parliament party group cohesion calculations on raw roll-call voting data, as there might be human errors contaminating previous researches. The raw roll-call voting data consisted of 13 Command Separated Value files, for which EP6 had six files for each year, and were provided by Simon Hix through email. An example of these Command Separated Value files can be seen in Figure 8. All 13 files provided data relevant to the first seven European Parliament terms, from 1979 till 2014, which spanned to 28,360 roll-call votes.

² The collection of the data was funded by a grant from the 'One Europe or Several' programme of the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom (no. L213 25 2019), an ACE grant from the Commission of the European Union, and an ARC grant 00/05-252 from the Communauté française de Belgique.




Figure 8: Command Separated Value file example

Each Command Separated Value file consisted of the following characteristics, as can be seen in Table 11.

Table 11: Roll-Call Vote Data Composition [44], [49], [66], [67]

Column	Description
1	Contains each MEP's ID number (MEPID)
2	Contains each MEP's name (MEPNAME)
3	Contains each MEP's member state (MS)
4	Contains each MEP's national party (NP)
5	Contains each MEP's EP group (EPG)
6	Voting decision of each MEP in each vote (V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n)

Each file was then imported into Microsoft Excel using the 'CSV file' import function, as can be seen in Figure 9.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V
1	MEPID	MEPNAME	MS	NP	EPG	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	V10	V11	V12	V13	V14	V15	V16	V17
2	2	ABENS Victor	L	1804	S	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	2	1	
3	5	ADAM Gordon J.	U	2404	S	2	2	4	1	1	1	1	4	4	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	
4	6	ADAMOU Dimitrios	G	1504	M	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
5	7	ADONNINO Pietro	I	1606	E	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	2	
6	9	AERSSEN Jochen van	D	1201	E	2	2	2	2	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	
7	12	AGNELLI Susanna	I	1618	L	3	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	
8	15	AIGNER Heinrich	D	1202	E	2	2	2	2	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	
9	17	ALAVANOS Alexandros	G	1504	M	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
10	18	ALBER Siegbert	D	1201	E	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	4	
11	19	ALBERS Willem	N	1906	S	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	
12	21	ALEMANN Mechthild von	D	1203	L	2	3	2	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	2	
13	23	ALEXIADIS Georgios	G	1503	N	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
14	24	ALFONSI Nicolas	F	1405	S	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
15	29	ALMIRANTE Giorgio	I	1601	N	2	2	2	2	0	4	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
16	38	AMENDOLA Giorgio	I	1613	M	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	1	
17	50	ANGLADE Magdeleine	F	1402	G	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
18	52	ANSART Gustave	F	1409	M	1	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	
19	53	ANSQUER Vincent F.M.	F	1404	G	2	4	4	1	0	4	1	2	2	2	3	0	4	4	4	4	
20	54	ANTONIOZZI Dario	I	1606	E	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	1	4	1	1	0	4	4	4	4	
21	63	ARFE' Gaetano	I	1621	S	1	1	4	2	0	4	3	4	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	
22	67	ARNDT Rudi	D	1207	S	2	2	2	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	
23	84	BADUEL GLORIOSO Maria Fabrizia	I	1610	M	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	4	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	
24	87	BAILLOT Louis	F	1409	M	1	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	
25	92	BALFE Richard A.	U	2404	S	2	4	2	1	0	1	4	4	4	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	
26	93	BALFOUR Neil R.	U	2401	C	2	2	2	2	0	4	4	4	1	1	1	2	2	4	2	1	
27	97	BANGEMANN Martin	D	1203	L	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	
28	100	BARBAGLI Giovanni	I	1606	E	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	2	

Figure 9: Imported Command Separated Value file into Microsoft Excel

3.1.2 Processing

Each term was subsequently split into additional Microsoft Excel sheets, for each European Parliament group, to analyse their cohesion. This was done by filtering the imported data by 'EPG' and copying and pasting the data into the European Parliament Group sheet, as seen in figure 10.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y
1	MER	MEPNAME	NR	NR	EPG	T																			
4	6	ADAMOU Dimitrios	G	1504	M	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
9	17	ALAVANOS Alexandros	G	1504	M	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
16	38	AMENDOLA Giorgio	I	1613	M	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	1	2	2	2	2	2
18	52	ANSART Gustave	F	1409	M	1	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1	1
23	84	BADUEL GLORIOSO Maria Fabrizia	I	1610	M	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	4	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	4	1
24	87	BAILLOT Louis	F	1409	M	1	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1
29	101	BARBARELLA Carla	I	1613	M	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	4	4	4	4	4
36	145	BERLINGUER Enrico	I	1613	M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	1	2	2	2	2	2
49	187	BONACCINI Aldo	I	1613	M	1	1	4	1	3	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
54	204	BOSERUP Bodil	K	1709	M	1	1	1	1	2	4	2	4	4	2	2	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1
60	237	BUCHINI Dominique	F	1409	M	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
68	281	CARDIA Umberto	I	1613	M	1	1	4	0	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
69	283	CARETONI ROMAGNOLI Tullia	I	1610	M	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
71	290	CAROSSINO Angelo	I	1613	M	1	1	4	1	0	1	1	1	3	0	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
77	323	CERAVOLO Domenico	I	1613	M	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2
78	333	CHAMBEIRON Robert	F	1409	M	1	1	4	1	3	4	1	2	3	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1
83	351	CINCIARI RODANO Maria Lisa	I	1613	M	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
108	439	D'ANGELOSANTE Francescopaolo	I	1613	M	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
112	434	DAMETTE Félix	F	1409	M	1	1	1	1	0	3	1	2	4	2	0	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1
119	461	DE MARCH Danielle	F	1409	M	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	2	3	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1
120	466	DE PASQUALE Pancrazio	I	1613	M	1	1	4	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	4	2	2	4	4	2	4	4
131	493	DENIS Jacques	F	1409	M	1	1	2	1	0	4	1	2	3	2	0	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1
147	566	EPHREMIDIS Vassilis	G	1504	M	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
152	594	FANTI Guido	I	1613	M	1	1	4	1	3	1	1	1	3	1	2	0	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
158	614	FERNANDEZ Guy	F	1409	M	1	1	4	0	3	4	1	2	3	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1
160	622	FERRERO Bruno	I	1613	M	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	4	2	2	1	2	4	4	4
177	676	FRISCHMANN Georges Louis	F	1409	M	0	0	0	1	3	4	1	2	3	0	2	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1
186	700	GALLUZZI Carlo Alberto	I	1613	M	1	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	4	2	2
208	774	GOUTHER Anselmo	I	1613	M	1	1	4	1	0	1	4	4	4	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
210	784	GREMETZ Maxime François	F	1409	M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	4	4	4	2	1	1	1
234	864	HOFFMANN Jacqueline	F	1409	M	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	1	2	1	1

Figure 10: Filtering EPG data

After this was done, and for each EPG Excel sheet, the voting decisions were calculated by counting the number of Yes, No and Abstain votes. Obtaining the Yes, No and Abstain votes is essential in calculating the Agreement index, as coined by Hix in Equation 4 [42]. The agreement index is calculated for each voting decision, and a value between 0 and 1 is obtained. These calculations are illustrated in Figure 11.

Yes	=COUNTIF(F2:F54,1)
No	=COUNTIF(F2:F54,2)
Abstain	=COUNTIF(F2:F54,3)
Agreement Index	=(MAX(F56:F58)-0.5*(SUM(F56:F58)-MAX(F56:F58)))/SUM(F56:F58)

Figure 11: Agreement Index Microsoft Excel calculations

In Microsoft Excel and through the use of the ‘Data Analysis’ function, the ‘Descriptive Statistics’ function was used to generate quantitative measures, as can be seen in Table 12. This was done for each of the seven terms and for each European Parliament group.

Table 12: Quantitative Measures

Measurement	Description
1	Average/Mean
2	Standard Error
3	Median
4	Mode
5	Standard Deviation
6	Sample Variance
7	Kurtosis
8	Skewness
9	Range
10	Minimum
11	Maximum
12	Sum
13	Count
14	Confidence Level (95.0%)

For the purpose of our research, the average/mean with the standard deviation will be used for a time-series analysis. These are then plotted onto an Agreement Index and Term graph to analyse the cohesive trend of each European Parliament group.

3.2 Survey Data

MEP survey data was obtained through Hix, Farrell, Scully, Whitaker and Zapryanova's work in [68]. They have constructed and published a survey for MEPs to fill out for EP5, EP6, EP7 and EP8 terms. Although, for the purpose of our research, we will only use the EP5, EP6 and EP7 survey results, as only these will be relevant to our roll-call vote data. These MEP surveys correspond to surveys conducted in 2000, 2006 and 2010. Through the acquisition of Hix et al. research in [68], a Microsoft Excel file was provided with all four survey MEP survey questionnaires (including variable coding) and results, as can be seen in Figure 12 and 13, respectively.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	Variable	2000 Q no.	2006 Q no.	2010 Q no.	2015 Q no.	Survey Question	Answer Options	Coding
2								
3	b_1	(entered after)	(entered after)	(entered after)	(entered after)	Case ID	continuous	
4								
5	b_2	(entered after)	(entered after)	(entered after)	(entered after)	MEP ID	continuous	
6								
7	b_3	(entered after)	(entered after)	(entered after)	(entered after)	Survey Year	2000	1
8							2006	2
9							2011	3
10							2015	4
11								
12	SECTION I. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS							
13								
14	q1_1	q1	q1_1	q1_1	q1_1	Member State	Belgium	1
15						In which member state were you elected?	Bulgaria	2
16							Czech Republic	3
17							Denmark	4
18							Germany	5
19							Estonia	6
20							Ireland	7
21							Greece	8
22							Spain	9
23							France	10
24							Italy	11
25							Cyprus	12
26							Latvia	13

Figure 12: MEP Survey Questions and Coding

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
1	b_1	b_2	b_3	q1_1	q1_2	q1_3	q1_4	q1_5b	q1_6	q1_7	q1_8
2	1	1	1	27	2	Labour	.	1979	.	1	2
3	2	2	1	10	6	PCF	.	1989	4	2	5
4	3	3	1	8	6	SYN	.	1981	3	1	4
5	4	4	1	26	2	SAP	.	1995	4	1	3
6	5	5	1	7	9	FF	Dublin	1984	5	1	1
7	6	6	1	9	2	PSOE	.	1994	4	1	3
8	7	7	1	26	1	MSP	.	1999	3	1	3
9	8	8	1	9	1	PP	.	1999	4	2	2
10	9	9	1	8	6	DIKKI	.	1999	4	1	3
11	10	10	1	27	2	Labour	London	1979	4	1	3
12	11	11	1	7	1	FG	Dublin	1984	5	2	1
13	12	12	1	9	2	PSOE	.	1986	4	1	1
14	13	13	1	9	2	PSOE	.	1999	4	1	2
15	14	14	1	19	2	SPO	.	1996	3	2	4
16	15	15	1	1	3	VLD	Flemish Belgium	1999	4	1	2
17	16	16	1	18	10	RPF/SGP/GPV(GPV)	.	1994	4	1	3
18	17	17	1	11	1	PPI	Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, \	1999	5	1	3
19	18	18	1	27	1	Con	London	1999	4	1	2

Figure 13: MEP Survey Results

It is also important to note that since MEPs are assessing themselves, their measures are biased as MEPs might not effectively be listing what truly happens in reality. Table 13 shows how each survey is divided into eight sections.

Table 13: Survey Sections

Section	Section Description
1	Personal Characteristics
2	Career
3	Political Attitudes and Identity
4	Attitudes on EU Policies and Reforms
5	Representation
6	Contacts
7	Legislative Behaviour
8	Campaigning Behaviour

We will particularly look into the ‘Legislative Behaviour’ section, as this section is focused on the following subsections, as seen in Table 14.

Table 14: MEP Survey Data - Legislative Behaviour Subsections

Subsections	Subject Area	Questions Area
1	Voting Instructions	‘How often do you receive recommendations on which way to vote from the following parties or groups?’
2	What Determines MEP Voting	‘In many cases people have different views concerning matters before the European Parliament. On which of the following would you be most inclined to base your decision in such cases?’

The ‘Voting instructions’ subsection is scaled on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 being ‘Never’ and 5 being on ‘Almost every vote’, whilst the variables on ‘What determines MEP voting’ subsection is scaled on a 4-point ranking scale. Table 15 illustrates the questions in each subsection:

Table 15: Survey Questions

Subsections	Questions	Scales
Voting instructions	Voting Instructions from European political group	5-point Likert Scale
Voting instructions	Voting Instructions from EP Committee	5-point Likert Scale
Voting instructions	Voting Instructions from European interest groups	5-point Likert Scale
What determines MEP Voting	Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th Choice
What determines MEP Voting	Follows Voters' Views in Voting	1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th Choice
What determines MEP Voting	Follow National Party Views in Voting	1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th Choice
What determines MEP Voting	Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th Choice

The result of the aforementioned questions was extracted from each European Parliament term and grouped by European Parliament party group.

Finally, the research is concluded by conducting analysis to uncover the correlation between the European Parliament party group roll-call vote cohesion data and the MEP survey data, which will be done using IBM SPSS. A trial version of this sophisticated programme will be used, which is available for 14 days, as it is costly to purchase.

4 Analysis and Results

This section will be divided into two subsections, Roll-Call Votes Results and Survey Data Result. Both results will be used to conclude our findings with respect to our research questions.

4.1 Roll-Call Votes Results

Since the primary focus area of this research is on European Parliament party group cohesion, it would be best to take a primary look at each European Parliament group. For this purpose, the Agreement Index and Standard Deviation would be extracted and analysed from each European Parliament group, together with their measurement explanation, as can be seen in Table 16.

Table 16: Measurement Description

Measure	Descriptive Reasoning	Measure Explanation
Agreement Index	It is the average Agreement Index of the whole term.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• High numerical value for Agreement Index will indicate that the European Parliament group are highly cohesive.• Low numerical value for Agreement Index will indicate the European Parliament group have low cohesiveness.
Standard Deviation	It is a measure used to quantify how the Agreement Index variates in a whole term.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• High numerical value for Standard Deviation will indicate that the European Parliament group voting is spread over a wider range of cohesive values.• Low numerical value for Standard Deviation will indicate that the European Parliament group voting is spread over a lesser range of cohesive values.

4.1.1 European United Left – Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL)

Figure 14 illustrates the party group cohesion of European United Left – Nordic Green Left.




Figure 14: Agreement Index/EP term - European United Left - Nordic Green Left Cohesion

Table 17 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for European United Left - Nordic Green Left.

Table 17: Measurements for European United Left - Nordic Green Left Cohesion

Measurement	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.789	0.853	0.861	0.800	0.780	0.852	0.794
Standard Deviation	0.28	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.21	0.19	0.21

4.1.2 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)

Figure 15 illustrates the party group cohesion of Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.




Figure 15: Agreement Index/EP term - Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

Table 18 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.

Table 18: Measurements for Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

Measurement	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.756	0.869	0.910	0.901	0.902	0.909	0.914
Standard Deviation	0.25	0.20	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.13

4.1.3 Greens/ European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)

Figure 16 illustrates the party group cohesion of Greens/ European Free Alliance.




Figure 16: Agreement Index/EP term - Greens/ European Free Alliance

Table 19 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for Greens/ European Free Alliance.

Table 19: Measurements for Greens/ European Free Alliance

Measurement	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.813	0.941	0.913	0.927	0.912	0.947
Standard Deviation	0.26	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.09

4.1.4 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)

Figure 17 illustrates the party group cohesion of Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.




Figure 17: Agreement Index/EP term - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

Table 20 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

Table 20: Measurements for Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

Measurement	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.841	0.847	0.829	0.861	0.882	0.886	0.885
Standard Deviation	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.15

4.1.5 European People's Party/Christian Democrats (EPP)

Figure 18 illustrates the party group cohesion of European People's Party/Christian Democrats.




Figure 18: Agreement Index/EP term - European People's Party/ Christian Democrats

Table 21 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for European People's Party/ Christian Democrats.

Table 21: Measurements for European People's Party/ Christian Democrats

Measurement	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.904	0.935	0.925	0.898	0.860	0.876	0.925
Standard Deviation	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.12

4.1.6 European Conservative and Reformists (ECR)

Figure 19 illustrates the party group cohesion of European Conservative and Reformists.




Figure 19: Agreement Index/EP term - European Conservative and Reformists

Table 22 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for European Conservative and Reformists.

Table 22: Measurements for European Conservative and Reformists

Measurement	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.834	0.842	0.843	0.792	0.760	0.734	0.857
Standard Deviation	0.28	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.18

4.1.7 European of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)

Figure 20 illustrates the cohesion of European of Freedom and Direct Democracy.




Figure 20: Agreement Index/EP term - European of Freedom and Direct Democracy

Table 23 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for European of Freedom and Direct Democracy.

Table 23: Measurements for European of Freedom and Direct Democracy

Measurement	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.77	0.673	0.515	0.463	0.480
Standard Deviation	0.33	0.28	0.26	0.25	0.24

4.1.8 Non-Attached MEPs (NI)

Figure 21 illustrates the cohesion of Non-Attached MEPs.




Figure 21: Agreement Index/EP term - Non-Attached MEPs

Table 24 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for Non-Attached MEPs.

Table 24: Measurements for Non-Attached MEPs

Measurement	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.571	0.674	0.626	0.640	0.463	0.454	0.384
Standard Deviation	0.33	0.40	0.35	0.30	0.25	0.22	0.20

4.1.9 MEPs from all European Parliament Parties

Figure 22 illustrates the cohesion of MEPs from all European Parliament Parties.




Figure 22: Agreement Index/EP term - MEPs in General

Table 25 is composed of the Agreement Index and Standard deviation measurements for MEPs from all European Parliament Parties.

Table 25: Measurements for MEPs from all European Parliament Parties

Measurement	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6	EP7
Agreement Index	0.783	0.833	0.819	0.837	0.761	0.761	0.773
Standard Deviation	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.21	0.20	0.18	0.17

4.1.10 Comparison between European Parliament Groups

Figure 23 illustrates the comparison between European Parliament parties, together with their respective cohesion using the Agreement Index.




Figure 23: Agreement Index/EP term - Comparison between European Parliament parties

4.1.11 Conclusion on Roll-Call Vote Data

Through this analysis, 28,360 roll-call votes were analysed to calculate each European Parliament party group's cohesion. Regrettably this figure is not the actual total number of votes taken in the European Parliament, due to votes being taken by show-of-hands or non-roll-call votes, where each and every MEPs votes are was recorded. Within individual European Parliament party groups, their response concurs to the Hix *et al* study in [42] as they 'observed an upward trend for PES (S&D), ELDR and Greens, downward trend for EPP since the second European Parliament and both upward and downward trend for Radical Left and the Gaullists and allies'. While their research was focused on analysing European Parliament party group cohesion between from June 1979 to June 2001, which translates to the European Parliament terms from EP1 till EP5, research was furthered till the latest available roll-call data of EP7. Whilst still coinciding with their findings, these following changes were observed:

- Greens/ European Free Alliance have a slight dip in cohesion between EP5 and EP6 and then an increase till EP7, as observed in Figure 16.
- European People's Party/ Christian Democrats have had a constant decline in party cohesion since EP2, yet it is observed that they developed an increase between EP5 to EP7, as can be observed in Figure 18.

It was also observed that the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) and European Conservative and Reformists (ECR), which are both at the ends of the left-right spectrum of the European Parliament, had a decrease from EP2 to EP5. In the former it was later observed that there was an increase and decrease till EP7 and the latter decreased and increased till EP7. Alternatively, a constant decrease was observed in the European of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and a slight increase between EP6 and EP7, and the causation could be for the sole reason that they are at the rightmost side of the left-right spectrum of the European Parliament. Although Non-Attached MEPS (NI) are not an actual European Parliament group, as they are unaffiliated MEPs, their cohesion is continuously increasing and decreasing in cohesiveness. Both these parties might encompass diverse MEPs from their respective national parties, which might hold different ideologies on various issues, yet it is evidently concrete in the Non-Attached MEPs (NI) party group.

A significant decline was witnessed from Figure 22 and 23 within the European Parliament group cohesion from EP4 until EP6. Investigation were carried out on what might have caused this, and the general belief is that there was an enlargement within the European Union at the beginning of 1994. Although this enlargement was not the largest, it was observed that the referendum results in favour of joining the European Union were considerably lower, compared to other referendum results [69]. The European Union saw the enlargement through accessions of Austria, Sweden and Finland, although Norway voted against in joining the European Union. Their referendum results were on average of 58.8%, and they were awarded 56 number of seats, as can be seen in Table 26. Also, the full amount of European Parliament seats was increased to 626.

Table 26: European Union 1994 Enlargement [70]

Country	Number of seats	Referendum Results
Austria	21	66.6%
Sweden	22	56.9%
Finland	16	52.8%
TOTAL	56	58.8%

Moreover, during that same period, Europe witnessed the breakup of Yugoslavia, where the varied reasons for the causality of this array ‘ranged from the cultural and religious divisions between the ethnic groups making up the nation’ [71]. This could have had an inevitable effect in MEPs being more conservative towards their national parties rather than their respective European Parliament party group.

In contrast, the increase in cohesion between EP6 and EP7 could have been because of the arrival of new members in the European Union at the beginning of EP6, as this was the most substantial single expansion in the European Union, as ten new member states joined. This was also a ‘mark for re-unification of Europe after decades of division’ [72]. In addition to this proposed causality of increased European Parliament party group cohesion, and in respect to the ten new member states that joined, their average referendum results of joining the European Union was of 70.1%, as seen in Table 27.

Table 27: European Union 2004 Enlargement [73]

Country	Number of seats	Referendum results
Czech Republic	24	77.3%
Estonia	6	66.8%
Hungary	24	83.8%
Latvia	9	67.5%
Lithuania	13	91.1%
Malta	5	53.6%
Poland	54	77.6%
Slovakia	14	93.7%
Slovenia	7	89.65
TOTAL	156	70.1%

Additionally, it collaborates with Hix *et al*'s study in [42], in respect to the 'while cohesion of parties has grown, cohesion of the Parliament as a whole has decreased steadily since 1988', yet it was observed that there was an overall increase between EP6 and EP7. Although the increase from EP6 to EP7 is an unprecedented and insightful finding, one can harmonise these findings to a decrease in radical or diverse ideology amongst MEPs from the left-right spectrum. Also, at the beginning of EP6, the increase of voting cohesion can be due to more inclined incentives within the European Parliament for MEPs to divide and concentrate on tasks between the party group members as explained by Hix and Noury in [44]. This is observed through the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty as this will 'create the legal framework and tools needed to meet Europe's most pressing challenges. By giving the directly-elected Parliament more power, it would make the EU more accountable'[74].

Furthermore, it is evident that European Parliament party group cohesion would be on the high side of the Agreement Index, as members would typically align and associate themselves with a party which has a similar ideology to their national party. Yet, this can also be contradictory if MEPs simply want to be with a European Parliament party to have more speaking time and more power as rapporteurs in European Parliament committees.

4.2 Survey Data Results

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the MEP survey data was gathered by Hix, Farrell, Scully and Zapryanova in [68]. The survey data has the following sample information, as can be seen in Figure 24.

	2000 Survey				2006 Survey				2010 Survey			
	Number	MEPs	%	Survey	Number	MEPs	%	Survey	Number	MEPs	%	Survey
Political Groups												
EPP	232	72	37.1	36.9	263	95	35.9	34.9	265	100	36	37
S&D (PES)	180	61	28.8	31.3	201	73	27.5	26.8	184	64	25	23.7
ECR									54	12	7.3	4.4
ALDE (ELDR)	52	20	8.3	10.3	89	44	12.2	16.2	85	43	11.5	15.9
EUL/NGL	42	14	6.7	7.2	41	15	5.6	5.5	35	10	4.8	3.7
G/EFA	48	13	7.7	6.7	42	18	5.7	6.6	55	23	7.5	8.5
EFDD (EDD / IND-DEM)	16	5	2.6	2.6	29	8	4	2.9	30	10	4.1	3.7
na	26	5	4.2	2.6	37	8	5.1	2.9	28	8	3.8	3
Correlation				0.99				0.99				0.98
Duncan index of dissimilarity				0.04				0.04				0.06
Chi-squared test				p=0.68				p=0.41				p=0.22
Totals	626	195			732	272			736	270		
Response rate (%)				31.15016				37.16				36.68

Figure 24: Survey Sample Information [68]

4.2.1 European United Left - Nordic Greet Left (EUL/NGL)

Figure 25 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for European United Left - Nordic Greet Left. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most.

	Likert Scale															
	2000								2006							
Voting Instructions from European political group	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	
Voting Instructions from EP Committee	2	1	3	0	1	1	0	4	3	1	1	3	4	3	1	
Voting Instructions from European interest groups	6	3	1	1	4	4	1	2	2	3	2	4	2	0	1	
	1	1	4	3	4	1	2	5	2	3	1	3	4	1	1	
	Ranked Scale															
	2000								2006							
Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice
Follows Voters' Views in Voting	18	2	3	0	7	2	1	4	1	2	2	8	2	2	1	0
Follow National Party Views in Voting	0	18	3	2	3	4	2	2	2	0	0	1	3	0	3	0
Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	3	5	2	4	0	2	4	1	3	2	3	1	1	1	1	2
	4	1	6	3	1	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	0	4	0	3

Figure 25: Survey Results: European United Left - Nordic Greet Left

4.2.2 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)

Figure 26 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most.

	Likert Scale															
	2000				2006				2010							
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	
Voting Instructions from European political group	2	4	3	8	46	2	3	3	11	37	2	3	8	12	28	
Voting Instructions from EP Committee	17	9	13	10	12	15	3	9	6	15	13	6	11	12	20	
Voting Instructions from European interest groups	9	10	18	22	4	3	5	10	23	14	7	9	20	9	8	
Ranked Scale																
2000																
	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice				
Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	43	11	4	3	33	4	4	12	34	14	2	2				
Follow Voters' Views in Voting	6	13	11	25	14	13	12	15	0	13	17	22				
Follow National Party Views in Voting	2	13	30	10	2	21	12	17	5	8	23	16				
Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	17	27	7	8	6	14	22	12	13	17	10	12				

Figure 26: Survey Results - Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

4.2.3 Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)

Figure 27 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for Greens/European Free Alliance. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most.

	Likert Scale													
	2000				2006				2010					
Voting Instructions from European political group	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4
Voting Instructions from EP Committee	1	1	3	0	8	1	0	4	3	3	0	0	1	1
Voting Instructions from European interest groups	5	3	1	1	1	4	1	2	2	2	1	1	3	0
	1	1	4	2	4	1	2	5	2	1	0	0	2	3
	Ranked Scale													
	2000				2006				2010					
Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	1st Choice	2nd Choice	4th Choice	0	1st Choice	2nd Choice	4th Choice	1	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	0	
	9	2	3	0	7	2	1	1	2	2	0	1	0	
Follow National Party Views in Voting	0	9	3	2	4	2	2	2	2	0	0	3	0	
	3	2	4	4	3	5	4	4	1	1	1	3	2	
Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	4	1	6	3	1	3	2	3	0	2	0	3		

Figure 27: Survey Results - Greens/European Free Alliance

Figure 28 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most.

Figure 28: Survey Results - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

4.2.5 European People's Party/ Cristian Democrats (EPP)

Figure 29 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for European People's Party/ Cristian Democrats. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most.

	Likert Scale									
	2000					2006				
Voting Instructions from European political group	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Voting Instructions from EP Committee	3	2	4	11	51	2	4	11	10	43
Voting Instructions from European interest groups	21	5	6	15	19	14	6	13	21	9
	8	11	26	17	6	5	7	23	20	7
	Ranked Scale									
	2000					2006				
	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice
Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	56	6	4	3	47	5	5	9	46	6
Follows Voters' Views in Voting	3	17	16	22	8	17	14	17	7	23
Follow National Party Views in Voting	4	24	14	16	6	19	23	9	3	14
Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	8	20	20	15	4	16	13	23	7	20
	2010									
	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice
Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	56	6	4	3	47	5	5	9	46	6
Follows Voters' Views in Voting	3	17	16	22	8	17	14	17	7	23
Follow National Party Views in Voting	4	24	14	16	6	19	23	9	3	14
Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	8	20	20	15	4	16	13	23	7	20

Figure 29. Survey Results - European People's Party/ Cristian Democrats

4.2.6 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

Figure 30 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for European Conservatives and Reformists. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs selected most. The sole reason why MEP Survey 2010 was obtained for European Conservative and Reforms, is because they were established in 2009.

		Likert Scale				
		2010				
		1	2	3	4	5
ECR	Voting instructions from European political group	0	0	1	2	5
ECR	Voting instructions from EP Committee	3	0	2	1	2
ECR	Voting instructions from European interest groups	2	3	2	1	0
		Ranked Scale				
		2010				
		1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	
ECR	Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	5	1	0	2	
ECR	Follows Voters' Views in Voting	1	2	3	2	
ECR	Follow National Party Views in Voting	2	1	3	2	
ECR	Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	0	4	2	2	

Figure 30: Survey Results - European Conservatives and Reformists

4.2.7 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)

Figure 31 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most.

[illegible]

Figure 31: Survey Results - Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

4.2.8 Non-Attached MEPS (NI)

Figure 32 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for Non-Attached MEPS. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most.

[illegible]

Figure 32: Survey Results - Non-Attached MEPS

4.2.9 MEPs from all European Parliament Parties

Figure 33 illustrates the ‘Voting instructions’ and ‘What determines MEP voting’ results for all MEPs who participated in the survey. The values for both subsections are the number of times MEPs selected that particular value for the Likert scale and Ranked scale, respectively. Additionally, the red cells are the highest values which MEPs chose most. This assessment was done to observe the general perspective of overall voting instructions and general voting preferences.

Likert Scale												
	2000				2006				2010			
Voting instructions from European political group	1	2	3	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
Voting instructions from EP Committee	10	10	17	28	120	11	9	26	39	98	10	32
Voting instructions from European interest groups	58	25	24	29	36	49	19	39	38	30	39	29
	23	28	56	49	23	12	28	51	63	26	18	56
												46
												15
Ranked Scale												
	2000				2006				2010			
Follow Personal Preferences in Voting	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	4th Choice
Follows Voters' Views in Voting	138	22	15	6	128	13	14	33	108	29	13	8
Follow National Party Views in Voting	11	57	42	54	38	49	34	51	12	46	45	53
Follow European Political Group Views in Voting	35	63	42	33	14	46	58	51	24	52	34	46

Figure 33: Survey Results - MEPs in General

4.2.10 Conclusion on MEP survey data

The response rate from the survey questions from 2000, 2006 and 2010 was of 35% from all the MEPs. Additionally, survey questions are usually prone to prestige bias, which is observed when individuals respond with the “right” answer rather than their honest opinion [75]. Moreover, factor analysis would be looked into, to distinguish which questions are highly correlated together between roll-call vote data and MEP survey data. Factor analysis is the process of representing a set of observed variables into a number of ‘common’ factors [76]. The common factors, which are also called latent variables, are hypothetical variables which explain why some variables are correlated to each other [76]. It tries to summarise a multitude of measurements into a smaller set of factors without losing too much information; thus, the key aim is to achieve a descriptive measurement [76].

To conduct a factor analysis model, what is required primarily is to conduct a correlation coefficient matrix among the observed variables. This is done to understand how each observable variable is affected by the other. The closer the numerical values are to 1 or -1 between two variables, the higher the correlation, directly or inversely, between both those variables, as can be observed in Table 28.

Table 28: Factor Analysis - Correlation Matrix

		Correlation Matrix						
		VotingInstructionsfromEuropeanpoliticalgroup	VotingInstructionsfromEPCommittee	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeaninterestgroups	FollowPersonalPreference sinVoting	FollowsVotersViews inVoting	FollowNationalPartyViews inVoting	FollowEuropeanPoliticalGroupViews inVoting
Correlation	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeanpoliticalgroup	1.000	.441	.269	.492	.327	.049	.234
	VotingInstructionsfromEPCommittee	.441	1.000	.579	.680	.567	.521	.557
	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeaninterestgroups	.269	.579	1.000	.386	.568	.466	.625
	FollowPersonalPreference sinVoting	.492	.680	.386	1.000	.085	-.049	.197
	FollowsVotersViews inVoting	.327	.567	.568	.085	1.000	.732	.674
	FollowNationalPartyViews inVoting	.049	.521	.466	-.049	.732	1.000	.665
	FollowEuropeanPoliticalGroupViews inVoting	.234	.557	.625	.197	.674	.665	1.000

After the correlation matrix is obtained, the communalities are calculated as the proportion of each observable variable's variance on the latent factors. This is defined as the 'sum of squared factor loadings for the variables' [77].

Table 29: Factor Analysis - Communalities

Communalities		
	Raw Initial	Rescaled Initial
VotingInstructionsfromEuropeanpoliticalgroup	79.775	1.000
VotingInstructionsfromEPCommittee	26.790	1.000
VotingInstructionsfromEuropeaninterestgroups	33.949	1.000
FollowPersonalPreferencesinVoting	122.135	1.000
FollowsVotersViewsinVoting	41.633	1.000
FollowNationalPartyViewsinVoting	48.773	1.000
FollowEuropeanPoliticalGroupViewsinVoting	43.789	1.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.		

Then, principal component analysis is used, which is an orthogonal transformation aimed at converting a set of observed variables into uncorrelated variables [78]. Principal component analysis stipulates that the total variance of each observed variable can be accounted for by the latent factors, i.e. extracted factors. The extraction of latent factors, in principal component analysis, is done through the use of calculating the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix, as 'the number of positive eigenvalues determines the number of dimensions needed to represent a set of scores without any loss of information' [79]. After which, the latent factors are constructed by calculating a transformation matrix which are determined by the eigenvalues, as seen in Figure 30. Latent factors that has an eigenvalue above the numerical value of 1, would mean that they have a significant correlation with the observed variables (Guttman-Kaiser rule) [78]. In this case, two distinct latent factors are detected between the observed variables, as can be observed in Figure 30 under 'Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings', row 'Rescaled'.

Table 30: Factor Analysis - Construction of latent factors from eigenvalues

Total Variance Explained							
	Component	Total	Initial Eigenvalues ^a		Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
			% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
Raw	1	192.922	48.614	48.614	128.275	32.324	32.324
	2	109.434	27.576	76.190	174.081	43.866	76.190
	3	49.944	12.585	88.775			
	4	17.830	4.493	93.268			
	5	13.131	3.309	96.577			
	6	9.097	2.292	98.870			
	7	4.486	1.130	100.000			
Rescaled	1	192.922	48.614	48.614	3.061	43.722	43.722
	2	109.434	27.576	76.190	2.134	30.485	74.208
	3	49.944	12.585	88.775			
	4	17.830	4.493	93.268			
	5	13.131	3.309	96.577			
	6	9.097	2.292	98.870			
	7	4.486	1.130	100.000			
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.							
a. When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution.							

Then, the factor loadings are calculated to determine the correlations between the latent factors and the original variables. There are two criteria for factor analysis using principal component analysis, which are [78]:

1. The new variables (principal components) should be chosen in such a way that the first component accounts for the maximum part of the variance, the second component the maximum part of the remaining variance, and so on.
2. The scores on the new variables (components) are not correlated.

After factor extraction, it might be difficult to interpret the latent factors and which factor loadings are significant as ‘most variables have high loadings on the most important factor, and small loadings on all other factors’ in vast amount of data [80]. Thus, factor rotation is used to alter the patterns of factor loadings and improve overall interpretation. Through factor rotation, these latent factors are rotated on their axes to make clusters of variables load more optimal [78]. SPSS provides two types of rotation; orthogonal and oblique rotation. The former rotation does not permit correlation between the extracted latent factors whereas the latter rotation permits. Thus, the former orthogonal rotation will be used since what is required is to maximize the distinguishable latent factors amongst the found observable variables. This will result in two calculations; reproduced covariance matrix and residual matrix. The reproduced covariance matrix consists of

‘post-rotation’ loadings on the correlation matrix based on the extracted factors. Values required are to be as close as possible to the original correlation, as this would stipulate that the latent factors extracted would amount to a more substantial variance on the original correlation matrix [77]. Subsequently, the residual covariance matrix consists of values which are composed of the negation of the original correlation matrix and the reproduced correlation matrix. Both reproduced covariance and residual matrix can be found in Table 31.

Table 31: Factor Analysis - Reproduced Covariance Matrix and Residual Covariance Matrix

		Reproduced Covariances						
		VotingInstructionsfromEuropeanpoliticalgroup	VotingInstructionsfromEPCommittee	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeaninterestgroups	FollowPersonalPreference sinVoting	FollowsVotersViews sinVoting	FollowNationalPartyViews sinVoting	FollowEuropeanPoliticalGroupViews sinVoting
Reproduced Covariance	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeanpoliticalgroup	43.162 ^a	26.841	20.632	67.108	14.678	6.584	17.332
	VotingInstructionsfromEPCommittee	26.841	20.663 ^a	19.067	36.228	19.777	16.621	20.914
	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeaninterestgroups	20.632	19.067	19.656 ^a	23.435	23.740	22.821	24.203
	FollowPersonalPreference sinVoting	67.108	36.228	23.435	111.971 ^a	8.060	-7.129	12.898
	FollowsVotersViews sinVoting	14.678	19.777	23.740	8.060	33.549 ^a	35.833	33.075
	FollowNationalPartyViews sinVoting	6.584	16.621	22.821	-7.129	35.833	40.524 ^a	34.619
	FollowEuropeanPoliticalGroupViews sinVoting	17.332	20.914	24.203	12.898	33.075	34.619	32.830 ^a
Residual ^b	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeanpoliticalgroup		-6.463	-6.632	-18.584	4.190	-3.522	-3.529
	VotingInstructionsfromEPCommittee	-6.463		-1.611	2.643	-.829	2.224	-1.852
	VotingInstructionsfromEuropeaninterestgroups	-6.632	-1.611		1.443	-2.368	-3.861	-.119
	FollowPersonalPreference sinVoting	-18.584	2.643	1.443		-2.014	3.376	1.540
	FollowsVotersViews sinVoting	4.190	-.829	-2.368	-2.014		-2.831	-4.306
	FollowNationalPartyViews sinVoting	-3.522	2.224	-3.861	3.376	-2.831		-3.883
	FollowEuropeanPoliticalGroupViews sinVoting	-3.529	-1.852	-.119	1.540	-4.306	-3.883	
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.								
a. Reproduced communalities								
b. Residuals are computed between observed and reproduced covariances.								

Later, the rotated component matrix was composed of pattern matrix and structure matrix. The former, also known as ‘Raw Component’, consisted of ‘regression coefficients of the variable on each of the factors’, whilst the latter, also known as ‘Rescaled Component’, consisted of ‘correlations between the variables and the factors [77], [79]. Both matrices can be found in Table 32.

Table 32: Factor Analysis - Raw and Rescaled Component Matrix

Rotated Component Matrix^a				
	Raw Component		Rescaled Component	
	1	2	1	2
VotingInstructionsfromEuropeanpoliticalgroup	1.471	6.403	.165	<u>.717</u>
VotingInstructionsfromEPCommittee	2.857	3.536	.552	<u>.683</u>
VotingInstructionsfromEuropeaninterestgroups	3.753	2.360	<u>.644</u>	.405
FollowPersonalPreferencesinVoting	-.406	10.574	-.037	<u>.957</u>
FollowsVotersViewsinVoting	5.708	.981	<u>.885</u>	.152
FollowNationalPartyViews inVoting	6.351	-.430	<u>.909</u>	-.062
FollowEuropeanPoliticalGroupViews inVoting	5.548	1.433	<u>.838</u>	.217
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.				
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.				

In the ‘Rescaled Component Matrix’, underlined values can be observed. These values illustrate which observed variables had a favourable correlation to which distinct latent factor. Consequently, these values could be represented graphically on a component plot on a rotated space, as seen in Figure 34.




Figure 34: Factor Analysis - Component Plot in Rotated Space

Through factor analysis, it was determined that from the seven MEP survey questions two distinct factors were distinct, which could also be clustered. The first latent factor was highly correlated to ‘Follow Personal Preference in Voting’, ‘Voting Instructions from European Political Group’ and ‘Voting Instruction from EP Committee’. This latent factor could be described as having MEPs who follow their own personal preference yet they are influenced by the European Parliament party group and European Parliament committee, which transpired to fit. The second latent factor correlated to ‘Follow Voters’ Views in Voting’, ‘Voting Instructions from European Interest group’, ‘Follow European Political Group Views in voting’ and ‘Follow National Party Views in Voting’. This latent factor could be described as MEPs following voters’, European political group and national views whilst being influenced through European interest groups, which logically also fit.

Lastly, a multivariate analysis of variance was conducted using linear regression. Linear regression is an approach to model the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. During this research, the dependent variable will be European Parliament party group cohesion and the independent variables will be two previously found factors, Factor 1 and Factor 2, as both the latter variables were found

through factor analysis and are based on the MEP survey questions. This is done to measure the different causes for cohesion on Factor 1 and Factor 2. Through linear regression, the model summary of our data is computed as can be seen in Table 33.

Table 33: Multivariate Analysis - Linear Regression: Model Summary

Model Summary ^b				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.365 ^a	.133	.117	.094957
a. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 2, Factor 1				
b. Dependent Variable: Cohesion				

In Table 33, we can deduce four values. The 'R' value of 0.365 corresponds to the square root of the 'R squared' value, and this is the correlation between the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable, which is European Parliament party group cohesion. This also corresponds to a positive correlation between European Parliament party group cohesion and Factor 1 and Factor 2. The 'R-squared' value is of 0.133 and this shows an overall measure of the strength of association between the independent variables and the dependent variable. It also is the proportion of variance of the dependent variable, European Parliament party group cohesion, which can be explained by independent variables, Factor 1 and Factor 2. The 'Adjusted R Square' value of 0.117 is the adjustment on the R squared value that penalizes the addition of extraneous predictors to the model, where as the standard deviation is the root mean squared error, which is a standard deviation of error term.

Table 34: Multivariate Analysis - Linear Regression: ANOVA

ANOVA ^a						
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.148	2	.074	8.231	.000 ^b
	Residual	.965	107	.009		
	Total	1.113	109			
a. Dependent Variable: Cohesion						
b. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 2, Factor 1						

In Table 34, ANOVA is calculated, which is the analysis on variance, where the *p*-value of 0 is observed. This reflects that the relationship between European Parliament party group cohesion and Factor 1 and Factor 2 is significant.

Table 35: Multivariate Analysis - Linear Regression: Coefficients

Coefficients ^a								
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.795	.009		87.809	.000	.777	.813
	Factor 1	<u>.035</u>	.009	.344	3.822	.000	.017	.053
	Factor 2	<u>.012</u>	.009	.123	1.361	.176	-.006	.030
a. Dependent Variable: Cohesion								

Through Table 35, we observe the predictor variables, which are constant, Factor 1 and Factor 2. The constant, which is the first variable and European Parliament party group cohesion, is referred to as the Y intercept, the height of the regression line when it crosses the Y axis, which is of 0.795. Under the ‘Unstandardized Coefficients’, the values for the regression equation are observed and these are predicting the dependent variable of European Parliament party group cohesion from Factor 1 and Factor 2. From the two underlined values, it is perceived that for Factor 1, the coefficient is 0.035, and for Factor 2, the coefficient is 0.012. It can also be established that for every unit of increase in Factor 1, a 0.035 unit in European Parliament party group cohesion is predicted, whilst holding Factor 2 constant, and for every unit of increase in Factor 2, a 0.012 unit in European Parliament party group cohesion is predicted, whilst holding Factor 1 constant. Through this, it can be concluded that Factor 1, which corresponds to the MEP survey questions: ‘Follow Personal Preference in Voting’, ‘Voting Instructions from European Political Group’ and ‘Voting Instruction from EP Committee’, has more effect on European Parliament party group cohesion, than Factor 2. Lastly, Factor 2 is observed to be less significant than Factor 1 when comparing the effects of cohesion in voting behaviour, since Factor 2 has a *p*-value of 0.176.

5 Conclusion

The criterion of this hypothesis was in analysing the relationship of whether European Parliament party groups are cyclical in cohesiveness and whether MEPs stay firm to their European Parliament group party's position rather than their national party.

I adopted the approach of collecting two means of data; MEP Roll-Call voting data [44], [49], [66], [67] and MEP Survey data [68], and analysis between both measurements was carried out. Credence is that through this study, academics can further analyse any institutional body to define what potentially influences MEP voting. The study has proved both hypotheses to be true.

The first hypothesis was confirmed as all European Parliament party groups are consistently increasing and decreasing in cohesiveness, as mentioned in the previous chapter, apart from those Non-Attached MEPs, who are not a European Parliament party group. It has to be acknowledged that even though results were exhibited, each term's standard deviation was concurrently decreased. This can evidently be seen through the funnel graphs. The cyclical cohesiveness is correlated to the 'Fusion Theory' by Wallace, as can be seen in Figure 35 [4]. This coincides with our findings on European Parliament party group cohesion.




Figure 35: Fusion Theory - Cyclical Up and Down

The second hypothesis was also confirmed, as MEPs preferred to vote for their European Parliament Group views rather than their National Party views. This could be observed through the factor analysis, where ‘Following personal preference in voting’, ‘Voting instructions from European political group’ and ‘Voting Instructions from EP Committee’ were correlated to the same latent factor when compared to the other relevant variables, which correlated to the second latent factor. Through multivariate analysis, it was also proven that when MEPs ‘Follow Personal Preference in Voting’, ‘Voting Instructions from European Political Group’ and ‘Voting Instruction from EP Committee’ had a statistically significant effect on European Parliament party group cohesion.

6 Future Works

Future works envisage the possibility of widening the study, bearing in mind different factors coming in to play. Overall, these elements could be handled in the following ways to expand this study further.

This study examines the roll-call votes from an MEP survey, in a time series analysis to observe the trends between each European Parliament term. It analysis the European Parliament voting subject area from factual voting results and MEPs' survey responses. Possible further research may entail the broadening of the scope of the study of how the analysis is furthered and/or methodology used. Additionally, the European Parliament Committees can be another subject area where further study and analysis will help to show how they come to an agreement.

Subsequently, an attractive future subject area includes the analysis of how the European Council conducts its voting and whether this correlates to a European Parliament group. Additionally, this framework can be applied to any institutional body to analyse how political parties function in their respective countries.

Lastly, the hope for this research to transcend itself to further approach the area of institutional bodies in their voting, as each voters' vote is influential.

7 Reference

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8 Appendix – MEP Survey Questions

Survey Question
Case ID
MEP ID
Survey Year
SECTION I. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Member State
In which member state were you elected?
EP Group
What is your Party/Political Group in the European Parliament?
National Party
Region/Locality
Which region, locality or city do you represent (if any)?
2010 & 2015: When did you first become an MEP (Month)
Date of Election
2000 and 2006: On what date did you become an MEP?
2010 and 2015: When did you first become an MEP (Year)
Age
What was your age at the beginning of July 1999 (in years)?
Gender
What is your gender?
Class Background
What do you consider your social class background (e.g. the occupation of your father)?
Education
How old were you when you stopped full-time education?
Survey mode
SECTION II. CAREER
Dual Mandate
Are you also a member of your national parliament (either house)?
National Party Leadership
Are you a member of an executive organ of your national party?
EP Leadership
Are you, or have you ever been, a President, V-Pres., or Quaestor of the EP?
EP Group Leadership
Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the Bureau of your EP party group?
EP Committee Leadership
Are you, or have you ever been, a Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson of one of the EP committees?
Past Career
Have you previously held any of these positions

Member of national parliament
Member of national government
European Commissioner
Observer to the European Parliament
European party or political group official
Assistant to an MEP
Official (fonctionnaire) in the European Parliament
Official in the Commission
Official in the Council
A 'lobbyist' in Brussels
None of the above
Have you ever held, or do you currently hold, any of these positions? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
National party office
Regional/local party office
Assistant to a national politician
Official in EU institution other than EP
Official in student organisation
Official in regional/local interest group
Member of national parliament
Member of national government
Regional or local elected office
European Commissioner
President of the European Parliament
President of a European political group
Leader of a national party delegation in the European Parliament
Chair or Vice-Chair of a European Parliament committee
Group Coordinator in a European Parliament committee
Vice-President or Quaestor of the European Parliament
Observer to the European Parliament
Domestic party official
European party or political group official
Assistant to MEP
Official (fonctionnaire) in the European Parliament
Official in the Commission
Official in the Council
Official in a professional association
Official in a trade union
Official in a women's organisation
Official in a national interest group
Official in a European interest group
A "lobbyist" in Brussels
Official in an interest group, trade union or professional association
Future Career
2000 & 2006: Where would you most like to be 10 years from now?

2010 & 2015: What would you like to be doing 10 years from now?
Member of the European Parliament
Chair of an European Parliament committee
Chair of an European political group
Member of a national parliament
Member of a national government
European Commissioner
Retired from public life
Head of a European/International Agency
Something else
Something else, please specify:
Do you intend to stand in the next European election?
(If answer no to above question): Why do you not intend to stand?
SECTION III. POLITICAL ATTITUDES & IDENTITY
Left-Right Self-Placement
Where would you place yourself on the Left-Right spectrum?
(2000&2006: 1-10 scale used)
(2010 & 2015: 0-10 scale used)
2015: In political matters, people talk of the 'left' and the 'right'. Where would you place each of the following on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'left' and 10 means 'right'? Yourself
Left-Right national party placement
Where would you place your national political party on the Left-Right spectrum?
(2006: 1-10 scale used)
(2010 & 2015: 0-10 scale used)
2015: In political matters, people talk of the 'left' and the 'right'. Where would you place each of the following on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'left' and 10 means 'right'? Your national political party
Left-Right EP group placement
Where would you place your European political group on the Left- Right spectrum?
(2006: 1-10 scale used)
(2010 & 2015: 0-10 scale used)
2015: In political matters, people talk of the 'left' and the 'right'. Where would you place each of the following on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'left' and 10 means 'right'? Your European political group
Left-Right party's voters placement
In political matters, people talk of the 'left' and the 'right'. Where would you place each of the following on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'left' and 10 means 'right'? Your party's voters
European and National Identity

Do you identify most with Europe, your member state, or your region, and which second and third?
European identity
Member State identity
Regional identity
Do you see yourself as?
Other: Specify
Utilitarian support for European integration
Has your country benefited from EU integration
Pro/Anti Europe Self-placement (note wording slightly different in 2015)
Where would you place yourself on the question of European integration?
(2000&2006: 1-10 scale used)
(2010&2015 0-10 scale used)
(2015: Some say European integration should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. Where would you place each of the following on the question of European integration? Yourself)
Pro/Anti Europe national party placement (note wording slightly different in 2015)
Where would you place your national political party on the question of European integration?
(2006: 1-10 scale used)
(2010&2015: 1-11 scale used)
(2015: Some say European integration should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. Where would you place each of the following on the question of European integration? Your national political party)
Pro/Anti Europe EP group placement (note wording slightly different in 2015)
Where would you place your European political group on the question of European integration?
(2006: 1-10 scale used)
(2010&2015: 1-11 scale used)
(2015: Some say European integration should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. Where would you place each of the following on the question of European integration? Your European political group)
Pro/Anti Europe voters' placement
Some say European integration should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. Where would you place each of the following on the question of European integration? Your party's voters
Socio-economic attitudes
Opinion on income inequality

Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income
Opinion on crime and punishment
Tougher action should be taken against criminals
2015: People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences
Opinion on government involvement in economy
Government should play greater role in managing the economy
2015: Governments should abstain from intervening in the economy
Note coding is reversed for 2015 wave to ensure consistency with previous waves
Opinion on Welfare Spending
Current welfare spending should be maintained even if it means raising taxes
Opinion on Drugs
The use of marijuana should be decriminalised
Opinion on Unemployment
It is more important to reduce inflation than to reduce unemployment
Opinion on Immigration
There should be fewer restrictions on immigration
2015: Governments should adopt a restrictive policy on immigration
Opinion on Abortion
Women should be free to decide for themselves on abortion
Opinion on same sex marriage
Same sex marriage should be legalized
SECTION IV. ATTITUDES ON EU POLICIES & REFORMS
Attitudes Towards EU Regulatory Policies
Do you think there should be more or less EU-wide regulation in the following areas?
Opinion on Health and safety regulation
Health and safety at work
Opinion on Labour rights regulation
Labour rights (e.g. Opinion on working time rules)
Opinion on Discrimination
Discrimination based on gender, race, religion, age, disability, and sexual orientation
Opinion on Parental leave
Parental leave
Opinion on Pregnant workers
Protecting the health and safety of pregnant workers
Opinion on Environmental regulation
Environmental protection standards
Opinion on Food safety regulation
Food safety standards
Opinion on EU-wide tax-rates
2000+2006: Taxation rates (e.g. Opinion on harmonised business taxes)

2010: Corporation taxes
Opinion on national immigration policies
National immigration policies
Opinion on consumer protection regulation
Consumer protection standards
Opinion on Media regulation
Media, broadcasting and audiovisual standards
Opinion on financial services regulation
Financial services
Opinion on regulation of personal income taxes
Personal income taxes
Attitudes Towards EU Budgetary Policies
Do you think more or less of the EU budget should be spent on the following areas?
Opinion on Agriculture spending
Agricultural price support
Opinion on Regional policy spending
Economic and social cohesion
Opinion on R&D spending
Scientific research and development
Opinion on Development Aid spending
Development aid
Opinion on Unemployment benefit spending
Direct unemployment assistance
Opinion on Refugee-support spending
Support for member states with the most refugees
Attitudes Towards EU Monetary Policies
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EMU and EU monetary policies?
Opinion on ECB Interest Rates
The current interest rate of the European Central Bank is too low
Opinion on Who should set interest rates
EcoFin (not the ECB) should set inflation targets in the Euro-zone
Opinion on Role of EP in EMU
The EP should have more power to influence interest rates in EMU
Opinion on Restrictions on government deficits
Governments should be allowed to run deficits of more than 3% of GDP
Opinion on UK in Eurozone
Britain should be a member of the Eurozone
Opinion on ECB openness
The minutes of the ECB Governing Council should be available to the public
Opinion on Fiscal Compact

The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance is sufficient for ensuring budgetary discipline in the member states
Attitudes Towards EU Trade Policies
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EU trade policies?
Opinion on Free Trade
2000+2006: The EU should promote global free trade at all costs
2010: The EU should promote global free trade
Opinion on WTO
The EU should abide by all World Trade Organization rules and rulings
Opinion on Global Labour Standards
The EU should support uniform global labour standards
Opinion on Global Environmental Standards
The EU should support uniform global environmental standards
Opinion on EU-US Trade Relations
All trade barriers between the EU and the USA should be abolished
Attitudes Towards EU Justice & Home Affairs Policies
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EU Justice and Home Affairs policies?
Opinion on Common EU political asylum policy
2000+2006: There should be a common EU policy on granting political asylum
2010: There should be a common EU policy and asylum burden sharing
Opinion on Common EU economic migration policy
There should be a common EU policy on economic migrants from third countries
Opinion on treatment of illegal migrants
There should be a common EU policy on how to treat illegal migrants
Opinion on migrant integration
There should be a common EU policy on migrant integration
Opinion on shared information
Information on the identity of suspected terrorists should be shared between the member states
Opinion on EU-wide Arrest Warrants
For serious crimes, the police in each member state should be able to issue arrest warrants across EU
Opinion on mutual recognition of court rulings
For serious crimes, national courts should automatically recognise rulings by courts in other member states
Opinion on Granting Citizenship
The EU should agree common rules for granting EU citizenship
Opinion on QMV in JHA

EU Justice and Home Affairs policies: The Council should vote by QMV on all JHA issues
Opinion on Co-Decision procedure in JHA
EU Justice and Home Affairs policies: JHA policies should be adopted using the Co-Decision Procedure
Opinion on free movement
Individual member states should be allowed to place restrictions on the free movement of people into their country.
Opinion on migrant access to benefits
EU migrants should be granted the same rights and access to public services as citizens of the recipient member state.
Attitudes Towards EU Common Foreign and Security Policies
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EU foreign and defence policies?
Opinion on EU-NATO relations
The EU rather than NATO should be responsible for Europe's defence
Opinion on Counterweight to US
EU foreign policy should develop as a counterweight to the United States
Opinion on EU Diplomatic Service
The EU should have its own Diplomatic Service
Opinion on EU's Security Strategy
The member states should make every effort to adhere to the EU's Security Strategy
Opinion on Russia
2006: The EU should develop closer political ties with Russia
2010 & 2015: The EU should develop closer political ties with Russia despite concerns about democracy and human rights in that country
Opinion on China
The EU should lift the embargo on the export of arms to China
Opinion on Mr. CFSP powers
"Mr.CFSP" should have the power to set the EU foreign policy agenda
Opinion on Commission powers in CFSP
The Commission should have the power to set the EU foreign policy agenda
Opinion on QMV in CFSP
The Council should vote by QMV when adopting 'joint actions'
Opinion on EP Role in CFSP
The EP should have the power to reject some foreign policy decisions
Opinion on EU military role
The EU should have its own military units available for 'rapid reaction'

Opinion on EU trade sanctions
The EU should use trade sanctions to secure political goals
Opinion on EU development aid policy
EU development aid should mainly go to well governed countries rather than the poorest
Opinion on benefits of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be beneficial for my country.
Opinion on healthcare in TTIP
The TTIP should exclude healthcare.
Opinion on TTIP and food safety
The TTIP should exclude food safety regulation
Opinion on membership based on Copenhagen Criteria
Which of the following states do you think should be allowed to join the EU if they apply for EU membership and successfully meet the Copenhagen Criteria for membership?
Albania
Belarus
Bosnia-Herzgovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Georgia
Iceland
Israel
Kosovo
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of)
Moldova
Montenegro
Morocco
Romania
Norway
Russia
2006: Serbia and Montenegro / 2010: Serbia
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
Opinion on Attitudes Towards EU Institutional Reform
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements about reform of the EU?
Opinion on Centrality of the Member States
The member states, not the Commission nor the European Parliament,
ought to remain the central pillars of the EU
Opinion on Commission as the EU Government

It is imperative that the European Commission becomes the true government of the European Union
Opinion on QMV in the Council
QMV should be used in all legislative decisions in the Council
Opinion on More Votes for Larger M.States
The voting-weights of the larger member states (under QMV) should be increased
Opinion on Larger States should not have 2 Commissioners
The larger states should have no more than one Commissioner
Opinion on right of each member state to a Commissioner
Member states should NOT have an automatic right to a Commissioner
Opinion on ECJ Powers
The powers of the ECJ should be curtailed
Opinion on EP right of Legislative Initiative
The European Parliament should have the right to initiate legislation
Opinion on EP Legislative Powers
The European Parliament should have equal legislative power with the Council in ALL areas of EU policy-making
Opinion on EP Budgetary Powers
The EP should be able to amend ALL areas of expenditure in the EU budget
Opinion on EP power to Nominate Commission President
The Commission President should be nominated by the EP, rather than the national governments
Opinion on Individual Approval of Commissioners by EP
Commissioners should be individually approved by the EP under the Assent Procedure
Opinion on EP power to sack individual Commissioners
The EP should be able to remove individual Commissioners from office
Opinion on Directly-Elected Commission President
The President of the Commission should be directly-elected
Opinion on EP right to be in Brussels
The EP should be allowed to hold all its plenary sessions in Brussels
Opinion on European party groups nominating Commission Presidency candidates
European political groups should nominate candidates for the Commission Presidency in future European elections.
Opinion on enhanced cooperation
The Treaty on European Union allows groups of member states to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves without the involvement of all 28 member states. Do you think that there should be more or less use of enhanced cooperation?

Opinion on responsibility for economic situation
How much responsibility do you think these different institutions have in the current economic situation in your country?
The national government
The European Union
The IMF
The banks
Foreign investors/speculators
The European currency - EURO
The people/everybody in the country
Opinion on UK renegotiation of relationship with EU
The government of the United Kingdom (UK) has expressed an interest in re-negotiating the UK's relationship with the European Union and then holding a referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EU. Are you in favour of continued UK membership in the EU? (Please choose one option from the list)
SECTION V. REPRESENTATION
Role of MEPs
When thinking about your work as an MEP, how important are the following aspects of your work?
Role is Legislating
2000: Taking part in legislation
2006, 2010 & 2015: Working on legislation
Role is Parliamentary oversight
Parliamentary oversight
Role is Social Group Representation
Articulation of important societal needs and interests
Role is Common EU strategies
Developing common strategies for EU policies
Role is Social Mediation
Mediation between different interests in society
Role is Individual Representation
Representation of individual interests of individual citizens
Group Representation
How important is it to you to represent the following groups of people in the European Parliament?
Represent Europe-Wide Interest
All people in Europe
Represent National Interest
All people in my member state
Represent National Party Voters' Interests
All the people who voted for my party
Represent Constituency Interest
2000 & 2006: All the people in my constituency
2010 & 2015: All the people in my constituency/region

Represent National Party Interest
My national party
Represent EP Party Interest
My EP party group
Represent Women
Women
Another group in Society, please specify
Specify
Time Spent at Home
How much time do you spend on political work in your home country rather than work at the European Parliament?
Demands for Time
MEPs receive requests for information or action both from constituents and from interest groups. About how many requests from the following might you receive in a typical week?
Demands from Constituents
Individuals from my constituency
Demands from Home Citizens
Other individuals from my country
Demands from Non-Home Citizens
Individuals from other countries
Demands from National interest groups
National interest groups
Demands from European interest groups
European interest groups
Travel to constituency
How often do you travel to your constituency?
SECTION VI. CONTACTS
Ways for Individual Voters to Contact MEP
Which of the following forms of contact with individual voters do you have?
Access via a permanently staffed office of my own
Access via a permanently staffed office shared with other MEPs
Access via party-run regional or national office
A PO box or an Automated Telephone Link
Regular consultation sessions (surgeries) for individual constituents
Occasional consultation sessions (surgeries) for indiv. constituents
Internet/e-mail (NOT INCLUDED AS A CHOICE - but written in survey)
Access via a personal website (2010:/blog/social networking site)
Personal consultation sessions for individual voters
Political Contacts
How frequently are you in contact with the following groups, people or institutions?

Contacts with Citizens
Ordinary citizens
Contacts with Interest Groups
Organised groups
Contacts with Lobbyists
Lobbyists
Contacts with Journalists
Journalists
Contacts with EP Group Leadership
Leaders of my European political group
Contacts with MEPs from other Home Parties
MEPs of other parties from my member state
Contacts with Commission staff
Officials in the Commission
Contacts with Commissioners
European Commissioners
Contacts with Council staff
2000: Officials in the Council Secretariat
2015: Officials in the Council of the European Union
Contacts with COREPER
Members of COREPER
Contacts with Ministers in Council
Ministers in the Council
Contacts with ECOSOC
Members of the Economic and Social Committee
Contacts with ECJ staff
Officials in the European Court of Justice
Contacts with CoR staff
Members of the Committee of the Regions
Contacts with National Party
Members of my national party
Contacts with National Party Leadership
Members of my national party executive
Contacts with Home MPs
MPs from my national parliament
Contacts with Home Ministers
Ministers from my national government
Contacts with Home Civil Servants
Civil servants/public officials from my national government
National Interest Group Contacts
2000, 2006, 2010: How frequently are you in contact with the following national interest groups?
2015: How frequently are you in contact with the following interest groups? [NB this question does not specify national or European level in 2015]

Contacts with National consumer groups
Consumer associations
Contacts with National environmental groups
Environmental organisations
Contacts with Women's organisations
Women's organisations
Contacts with National trade unions
Trade unions
Contacts with National professional associations
Professional associations
Contacts with National agric/fisheries groups
Agriculture/fisheries organisations
Contacts with National industry organisations
Industry organisations
Contacts with National transport groups
Transport associations
Contacts with National trade/commerce associations
Trade and commerce associations
Contacts with National banking/insurance groups
Banking and insurance associations
Contacts with other groups
Other, please specify:
Specify
Contacts with human rights groups
Human rights organisations
European Interest Group Contacts
How frequently are you in contact with the following European interest groups?
Contacts with European consumer groups
Consumer associations (e.g. BEUC)
Contacts with European environmental groups
Environmental organisations (e.g. EEB, Greenpeace)
Contacts with European Women's organisations
Women's organisations (e.g. EWL)
Contacts with European trade unions
European trade unions (e.g. ETUC)
Contacts with European professional associations
Professional associations (e.g. CEPLIS)
Contacts with European agric/fisheries groups
Agriculture/fisheries organisations (e.g. COPA)
Contacts with European industry groups
Industry organisations (e.g. UNICE)
Contacts with European transport groups
Transport associations (e.g. AET)
Contacts with European trade/commerce associations

Trade and commerce associations (e.g. UEAPME)
Contacts with European banking/insurance groups
Banking and insurance associations (e.g. GCECEE, CEA)
Contacts with European human rights groups
Human rights organisations (e.g. Amnesty)
Contacts with other groups
Other, please specify:
Specify
SECTION VII. LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOUR
Voting Instructions
How often do you receive recommendations on which way to vote from the following parties or groups?
Voting Instructions from National Party
You national party leadership
Voting Instructions from European political group
Your European political group leadership
Voting Instructions from National Delegation
Your national party delegation of MEPs
Voting Instructions from EP Committee
Your EP committee leadership
Voting Instructions from EU Commission
The European Commission
Voting Instructions from National Government
Your national government
Voting Instructions from European interest groups
2000, 2006, 2010: European interest groups
2015: Interest groups
Voting Instructions from National interest groups
National interest groups
Voting Instructions from Individual Citizens
2000, 2006, 2010: Private citizens
2015: Voters in your constituency
Party Group Alignments
On issues in the EP, how often is your position the same as the majority in these Party Groups?
Vote with EPP-ED Majority
European People's Party/European Democrats (PPE/DE)
Vote with PES Majority
Party of European Socialists (PSE)
Vote with ELDR Majority
European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR)
Vote with G/EFA Majority
Greens/European Free Alliance (V/ALE)
Vote with EUL/NGL Majority
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)

Vote with UEN Majority
Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN)
Vote with TGI Majority
Technical Group of Independents (TDI)
Vote with EDD Majority
Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD)
Voting Position aligned with majority in EPG
How often is your position on an issue the same as the majority in your European political group ? Tick one box only.
What Determines MEP Voting
In many cases people have different views concerning matters before the European Parliament. On which of the following would you be most inclined to base your decision in such cases?
Follow Personal Preferences in Voting
Follow my own judgement
Follows Voters' Views in Voting
Follow the views of the voters of my national party
Follow National Party Views in Voting
Follow the view of my national party leadership
Follow European Political Group Views in Voting
Follow the view of my European political group
Conflict between national party and EP group
When your view differs from the voters of your national party, the national party leadership or the view of your European political group, do you choose not to take part in a vote or to abstain?
Not take part if national party and EP group in conflict?
In this situation, how often do you choose not to take part in a vote?
Abstain if national party and EP group in conflict?
In this situation, how often do you choose to register an Abstain vote?
Relationship with European political group
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
EP group members should not speak openly
Members of a European political group should not speak openly about discussions within the European political group
Should vote with EP group, even if disagree
If the opinions of the European political group appear in conflict with one's own opinions, it is correct to vote with the European political group
Should vote against EP group, if pressure from constituents
If a member of parliament is under pressure from constituents it is correct that s/he votes against the expressed will of the European political group
No initiatives with authority of EP group

No political initiatives should be taken without the
authorisation of the European political group
Important to be united
For our European political group it is very important to appear united
EP group leadership should enforce unity
The leader of a European political group should, as far as possible,
ensure the unity of
European political group. In doing so the use of far reaching means,
such as the
denial of particular parliamentary posts (e.g. seats on committees), is
legitimate
Opinion on unity of EP group
Very generally, what is your opinion on the unity of your European
political group?
Office Preferences
If you had the chance to win any of the following posts, which one
would you choose?
Preference for EP Group President
President of my EP party group
Preference for National Delegation Leader
Leader of my national party delegation
Preference for President of the EP
President of the European Parliament
Preference for EP Committee Chair
Chairperson of my EP committee
Committee Choices
Here are a list of reasons why MEPs choose which EP committee to
join. How important were each of these reasons in deciding which
committee to join after the 1999 European elections?
Committee Choice for Personal Interests
The committee concerns my personal interests
Committee Choice for Constituency Interests
2000: The committee is important to my constituents
2006, 2010, 2015: The committee is important to my voters
Committee Choice because of professional expertise
The committee tackles topics in which I have professional expertise
Committee Choice Because of Cmte Importance
The committee covers important issues
Committee Choice because of EP Group Decision
I was asked to serve on the committee by my EP party group
Committee Choice because of National Party Decision
I was asked to serve on the committee by my national party
Committee Choice because already a cmte member
I was a member of this committee in the last European Parliament

How many reports have you authored in the current Parliamentary term ?
Favoured committee
After the 2014 European election, which committee did you most want to sit on?
Foreign Affairs
Development
International Trade
Budgets
Budgetary Control
Economic and Monetary Affairs
Employment and Social Affairs
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Industry, Research and Energy
Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Transport and Tourism
Regional Development
Agriculture and Rural Development
Fisheries
Culture and Education
Legal Affairs
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Constitutional Affairs
Women's Rights and Gender Equality
Petitions
Committee positions
Which committee(s) do you currently sit on as a full member?
Foreign Affairs
Development
International Trade
Budgets
Budgetary Control
Economic and Monetary Affairs
Employment and Social Affairs
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Industry, Research and Energy
Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Transport and Tourism
Regional Development
Agriculture and Rural Development
Fisheries
Culture and Education
Legal Affairs
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Constitutional Affairs

Women's Rights and Gender Equality
Petitions
Actions when making decisions on legislation
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? When making decisions on legislation, MEPs should:
Defend their national position
Look for a common policy in collaboration with MEPs from other member states and party groups
Agree compromises on a legislative proposal in return for other MEPs' support on other legislative proposals
Effects of positive and negative responses on MEPs' decision-making
When making decisions in the European Parliament, are MEPs affected by any of the following? [please tick any that apply]
Praise
Acceptance
Recognition
Isolation
Loss of support
Criticism
SECTION VIII. CAMPAIGNING BEHAVIOUR
National district vs. regional districts
Do you think MEPs should be elected in your member state in one national district or in several regional or local districts?
European-wide top-up list
How many MEPs should be elected on a European-wide top-up list?
Vote for individual candidates not just parties (e.g. open lists)
2010: In European Parliament elections, do you think citizens should be able to vote for individual candidates rather than just for political parties (for example in an 'open' list form of proportional representation, as opposed to a 'closed' list form of PR)?
2015: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In European Parliament elections, citizens should be able to vote for individual candidates rather than just for political parties (for example in an 'open' or 'semi-open' list form of proportional representation, as opposed to a 'closed' list form of PR)?
Which of the following statements on quotas for women candidates comes closest to your views?
In your party, how important are the following groups in the selection of candidates for the EP?
Importance of following group in your party: National party officials
Importance of following group in your party: Regional/local party officials
Importance of following group in your party: Individual party members

Importance of following group in your party: Non-party members
Importance of following group in your party: Interest groups, for example, trade unions
When you first became a candidate for the EP did any of the following encourage you to stand
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: a national party official
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: a regional/local party official
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: a sitting MEP
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: a retired MEP
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: other community leaders
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: a representative of an interest group
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: my spouse/partner
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: other members of my family
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: other, please specify
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: specify
Encouragement to stand for MEP from: no one
How much effort did you and your team put into the following activities in the 2004/2009 election campaign?
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Telephone canvassing
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Door-to-door canvassing
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Organising direct mailing
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Party meetings
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Public meetings
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Press conferences
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Media relations
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Maintaining a campaign website
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Direct email
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Weblogs ('blogs')
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Fundraising
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: A personal social networking site (e.g. Facebook)
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: Other campaign activities, please specify:
Effort in 2004/2009 campaign: specify
Were any of the following activities part of your 2014 campaign? If yes, how important were they?
Door-knocking, canvassing
Distributing party campaign material
Calling up voters on the phone
Visiting businesses and social organisations
Meetings with party elites/members and/or party groups
Media activities (interviews, press releases)
Public speeches and rallies
Personal campaign posters

Direct mailing
Personal newspaper ads
Personal spots in radio, TV, movie houses
Personal flyers or other campaign material (give-aways)
Personal website
Mailing list to inform supporters and voters about my campaign
Own blog
SMS messages
Facebook or Twitter
Other
If 'other', please specify below:
What sort of campaign materials were produced by you, or on your behalf during the 2004/2009 campaign?
Materials produced for campaign: campaign brochures/ newsletters/ leaflets
Materials produced for campaign: Campaign posters
Materials produced for campaign: email messages
Materials produced for campaign: personal webpage
Materials produced for campaign: stickers/badges/buttons
Materials produced for campaign: radio advertisements
Materials produced for campaign: television advertisements
Materials produced for campaign: newspaper advertisements
Materials produced for campaign: SMS messages
In final weeks, how much time per week spent campaigning
During your campaign, how much contact did you have with your party's campaign headquarters
Media coverage during campaign
Media coverage during campaign: Television
Media coverage during campaign: National radio
Media coverage during campaign: Local radio
Media coverage during campaign: National Newspapers
Media coverage during campaign: Local newspapers
Media coverage during campaign: Internet in general
Media coverage during campaign: Party website
Primary aim of the campaign-party or candidate?
What was the primary aim of your campaign?
Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Personal objectives in association with this campaign
Personal objective of campaign: Maximising the voter turnout generally
Personal objective of campaign: Maximising the vote for your party
Personal objective of campaign: Maximising your personal vote
Personal objective of campaign: Preventing another party from getting votes

In your opinion, how much attention did the 2004/2009 European elections get in the news media in your member state?